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Abstract 
 
Executive remuneration is influenced by multiple factors including capital markets, 
product markets, corporate internal governance, corporate finance, governmental 
regulation, and legislation. Related to various practical factors, executive 
remuneration is no longer simply fixed based on the contractual arrangements 
between companies and their directors. Due to the complicated relationship network 
in executive remuneration and the way public companies produce their remuneration 
policies, remuneration structures and levels can be extremely complex and easily 
affected by undue influence. This paper focuses on how to solve executive 
remuneration problems through regulation. Legislations from several developed 
countries in areas such as providing shareholders with more power in voting for a 
companies’ remuneration plan, increasing board accountability in remuneration 
design, and putting employee representatives on boards in producing pay plans will 
be critically analyzed, followed by some reform proposals. This paper examines 
regulation settings through the lens of a few factors including the relationships 
between executive pay and shareholder voting power, board accountability, and 
remuneration design. Observations and proposals will be made, including positive 
correlations between shareholder intervention in remuneration issues and the 
company’s long-term productivity, prompting board accountability through more 
concrete regulatory frameworks, and the narrower emphasis of regulations on 
remuneration structure and design. 
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Introduction 
 
The economist Roger Bootle once argued that “the level of executive pay is a total and 
complete scandal. There is a real crisis of capitalism about all this. Where people are 
paying themselves tens of millions of pounds, it adds up to a form of expropriation”.1 
The High Pay Commission in the UK emphasized that excessively high pay is “a 
symptom of a wider market failure based on a misunderstanding of how markets 
work at their best.”2  According to the Commission’s investigation, in 2011, even 
though economic growth was slow, executive remuneration in FTSE 100 companies3 
had risen by 49% on average, compared with a 2.7% average increase in employees’ 
payments.4 It was suggested that the growing income gap between top executives 
and average employees might pose a threat to companies’ long-term interests.5 
 
In order to have a better understanding of the executive compensation problem, it is 
essential to undertake an in-depth analysis of the rationale for the awarding of 
compensation. In the UK, the Corporate Governance Code defines the board’s role as 
“to provide entrepreneurial leadership of the company within a framework of 
prudent and effective controls which enables risk to be assessed and managed”.6 
Directors owe fiduciary duties to their companies, as well as a duty of care.7 The duty 
to avoid conflicts in the scope of fiduciary duties8 in particular requires a personal 
obligation to practice good conscience and loyalty to the company. Because a 
                                              
1 Julia Finch, Jill Treanor & Richard Wachman, Critics Unite over Executive Pay to Force the ‘Aliens’ of 
Business down to Earth, The Guardian (Mar. 31, 2010), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/mar/31/myners-urges-fsa-to-investigate-shareholders-
role  
2 The High Pay Commission, Cheques with balance: why tackling high pay is in the national interest (2012), 
available at: http://highpaycentre.org/files/Cheques_with_Balances.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2018) 
3 London Stock Exchange (LSE), http://www.londonstockexchange.com/statistics/ftse/ftse.htm 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2018). FTSE 100 is the first 100 public companies listed in the LSE, FTSE 250 is the 
companies listed from the 101st to 250th in the LSE.  
4 Id. 
5 Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. Pol. 
Econ. 225, 261 (1990) 
6 Corporate Governance Code 2016, FRC, 2016/April, sec. A, ¶1 (Eng.). 
7 For example, see Companies Act 2006, c.2, §§172, 174 (Eng.). 
8 See Companies Act 2006, c.2, §175 (Eng.). 
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“deficient” remuneration structure can encourage risk-taking and thereby cause 
damage to the company,9  directors should not be the parties who decide on the 
amount of their own remuneration. They should neither permit someone who is 
dependent on the directors to decide on their remuneration, nor receive an “excessive 
and unreasonable” amount of money.10 Furthermore, it is often suggested that the 
shareholders, as the “owners” of the company, must be given the power to protect 
their interests, and they should have a right to express their views on executive 
remuneration or on the risks imposed by the company’s remuneration practices.11  
 
From a contract perspective, when directors are employed by the company they are 
bound by the company’s articles of association. Problems may then appear if the 
company seeks to amend the terms of a director’s remuneration without complying 
with the articles. 12  According to the Code, this problem can be resolved by 
introducing a claw-back provision to prevent rewards for failure.13 Despite the fact 
that topics related to the rationale and reasons for executive remuneration have been 
discussed, issues of how to regulate and the forms of regulation have been rarely 
examined. The article aims to fill this gap. 
 
The article will focus on the measures and trajectory of executive remuneration 
regulation by addressing the following research question: if regulation is appropriate 
and the way forward, what form should it take to solve current executive 
remuneration problems? The article will offer a comprehensive analysis of three 
concerns, including pay for underperforming executives, shareholders’ difficulties in 
                                              
9 Janice S. Miller, Robert M. Wilseman & Luis R. Gormez-Mejia, The Fit between CEO Compensation 
Design and Firm Risk, 45 ACAD. MGMT. J. 745, 754 (2002). 
10 Joseph Lee, Regulatory regimes and norms for directors’ remuneration: EU, UK and Belgian law compared, 
13 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 599, 603 (2012). 
11 Id. at 609. 
12 Id. at 612. 
13 FRC, supra note 6, Schedule A (“Consideration should be given to the use of provisions that permit 
the company to reclaim variable components in exceptional circumstances of misstatement or 
misconduct”);  
Note, about Claw-back, see David. L. Scott, Wall Street Words: An A to Z Guide to Investment Terms 
for Today’s Investors, 63 (3rd ed. 2003) (“A claw-back is required when managers take a contractual 
share of early investment gains that are subsequently reduced by losses”). 
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understanding pay reports, and the increasing pay gaps between executives and 
formal employees, followed by a critical analysis of possible solutions.  
 
Looking at the current attempts at legislative reform in this arena, the aims of 
governments in reforming executive remuneration practice are to promote long-term 
success for their public companies and economies, using the method of providing 
shareholders with stronger powers to securitize executives’ pay. To empower 
shareholders with more voice on directors’ remunerations, a “say on pay” regime has 
become a global trend as an attempt to solve executive remuneration problems. 
However, this global trend is subject to a number of uncertainties, such as: Is 
shareholder empowerment in terms of a say on pay able to assure long-term 
productivity? If the empowerment is not as useful as governments think, are there any 
other methods within the domain of corporate governance to ensure pay for 
performance? Will board accountability to shareholders in relation to executive pay 
be sufficient to improve pay design? We will address these questions in this article, in 
order to provide a comprehensive answer to the issue of how to regulate remuneration.  
 
A functional and effective mechanism for setting executive remuneration will be 
proposed in a normative way. If agency theory and managerial theory can be used as 
theoretical bases to prove that pay for performance is the final goal of setting executive 
managers’ remuneration, an effective way to achieve this final goal should be 
proposed. The focus of this article is on how to achieve this goal effectively and 
efficiently, together with the challenges of designing a more appropriate and workable 
remuneration system. The requirements for forming a good remuneration system will 
be discussed from several perspectives, such as the vesting period design of long-term 
incentive plans, the balance between motivation and punishment, and non-financial 
incentives in executive pay.  
 
We will consider the central relationships that emerge from practical factors between 
executive pay and shareholder intervention, board accountability and shareholder 
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participation. Good pay practices will be analyzed from the perspectives of the 
shareholders, the executive directors, the board, and employees.  
 
This article is an original attempt to establish a more effective regulatory framework 
for executive remuneration problems through shareholder empowerment, board 
accountability, and executive remuneration design. Current executive remuneration 
problems are categorized into two perspectives: pay for underperformance and 
deficient remuneration structures. Building on existing research on current regulatory 
methods to solve remuneration problems and improve the system’s effectiveness, this 
article makes some original contributions to establishing detailed proposals for better 
regulatory frameworks and legislative instruments in a few respects. These include 
adjusting shareholders’ voting rights and participation in voting for executive 
remuneration policies, emphasizing the board’s remuneration reporting and liabilities 
for directors’ failures in negotiating remuneration design, and improving 
remuneration design by requiring longer holding periods of executive’s incentive 
equities in the company.  
 
The article is organized in three subsections. After the introduction, Section I will 
explore the rationale for having a shareholder say on pay. It will suggest that having 
shareholder power over remuneration policy making will not be harmful to the 
company’s long-term productivity. Arguments will be made to support the point that 
shareholders, as a whole, belong to a separate group in corporate governance that 
tends to focus on the company’s long-term success. The advantages and 
disadvantages of shareholder empowerment will be discussed from the say on pay 
experiences of the UK and the US. This section will demonstrate that shareholder 
intervention has a positive influence over issues of executive remuneration. This 
section will also provide several suggestions for shareholders about how to improve 
their intervention.  
 
Section II will provide a discussion about the need for board accountability. Contrary 
to shareholder empowerment, director primacy suggests that executive remuneration 
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should not be subject to much, if any, interference from shareholders. This section will 
provide evidence that board accountability is not adequate to solve remuneration 
problems and to promote a company’s long-term success without regulatory 
intervention. Problems and good examples of ways to solve these issues will be 
investigated, and several suggestions will be provided for how to improve 
accountability. Along with the suggestions provided in Section I, several principles 
will be suggested for how to improve the board’s service when making remuneration 
reports.  
 
Section III will provide proposals for improving executive remuneration pay plans. A 
summary of regulatory suggestions will provide guidance for how to adjust the pay 
structure to align pay and performance based on the spirit of company law and 
empirical evidence.  
 
Additionally, fairness issues in pay will be investigated. There will be a discussion 
around employees participating in executive pay design and practice. The 
shareholders’ say on pay, as a comparatively practical method to monitor executive 
pay, has not been recognized as the only way to solve compensation problems. The 
notion of having an employee say on pay has been mentioned by many scholars, 
although a workable method is difficult to be established. Some suggestions for how 
to achieve a broader scope of say on pay will be provided in Section IV. 
1. Shareholder Say on Pay 
1.1 Shareholder Power and Long-Term Success  
 
Shareholder empowerment is a notion that legislation can adopt in order to provide 
investors with the power to monitor management issues in companies. However, a 
consensus has not been reached on the efficiency and effectiveness of shareholder 
intervention in companies. Evidence from the financial crisis 2008 showed that 
shareholders in the UK’s public companies were provided with a greater scope of 
power under company law and corporate governance in comparison with the US. 
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However, stock prices fell faster in the UK than they did in the US during 2008, which 
led to a financial crisis in the UK as serious as that in the US.14 In terms of the history 
of UK company law legislation, it would be misleading to say that the basic features 
of modern companies, such as their separate personality, centralized management, 
limited liability, and the free transfer of shares, have evolved together to form today’s 
corporate model. 15  Nonetheless, these basic features were generated by law at 
different times and adjusted to later environments.16  
 
The two most common approaches created by company law legislations to enable 
shareholders to intervene in the management of companies include the exit channel 
and the voting channel. 17  In public companies, shareholders can express their 
dissatisfaction and subsequently make an impact on managerial decisions by 
threatening to sell their shares, which may lead to a drop in the share price. This may 
not only make the managers concerned about their incentive equity compensation, 
but also have negative effects on the reputation of the company18 and ultimately on 
the reputations of the managers. The other way is for shareholders to express their 
opinions by voting against certain board decisions or directors at shareholders’ 
meetings.19 The shareholders’ say on pay is one factor in the second channel.  
 
In addition to agency theory, the high liquidity of capital markets also has a huge 
impact on the trajectory of corporate law and governance development. 20  The 
                                              
14 Brian Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance “Fail” during the 2008-9 Stock Market Meltdown?, 124 ECGI 
L. Working Paper 6 (2009) 
15 Simon Deakin, Corporate Governance and Financial Crisis in the Long Run, 417 U. of Cambridge 
Working Paper CTR. for BUS. RES. 6 (2010) 
16 Id. 
17 Konstantinos Stathopoulos & Geoigios Voulgaris, The Impact of Shareholder Activism: The case of say-
on-pay, 24 CORP. Governance: An INT’L REV. 359, 360 (2015).  
18 Alex Edmans, Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia, 64 The J. of FIN. 2481, 
2493 (2009); See also Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, The Wall Street Walk and Shareholder Activism: 
Exit as a form of voice 22 REV. of FIN. STUD. 2445, 2476–77 (2009).  
19 R. Ashraf, N. Jayaraman & H.E. Ryan. Jr., Do Pension-related Business Ties Influence Mutual Fund 
Proxy Voting? Evidence from Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation, 47 J. of FIN. & 
Quantitative Analysis 567, 573 (2012) 
20 Simon Deakin, supra note 15, at 8. 
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financial crisis 2008 generated huge concerns that the increasing liquidity of capital 
markets changed the ownership pattern of public companies—from family members 
to institutional shareholders through widely diversified pension funds and mutual 
funds.21 Furthermore, there is a trend for shares to be held for relatively short periods, 
including those owned by institutional shareholders such as hedge funds, insurance 
policies, and securitized instruments.22 With the rapid increase of equity liquidation, 
the use of shareholder power can become complicated. Since these shareholders make 
the presumption that their investments will only stay for a short time in one company, 
it is be doubtful whether they will focus on the companies’ long-term interests when 
they vote on corporate policies, being more likely to sell their shares and terminate 
their interest in the company.  
 
Say on pay reforms, which enhanced shareholders’ powers to improve board 
accountability in the 1970s and the early 1990s, may have already conferred too much 
power on the shareholders. 23  It has been suggested that these reforms may be 
erroneous in regulating shareholders’ power. For example, institutional shareholders, 
who are more likely to make informed decisions, tended to see their equity capital 
contribution decline during the financial crisis. Moreover, providing them with more 
power for intervention in management may cause other problems24 such as short-
term rent-seeking behaviors and sudden extractions. Nonetheless, it may be too 
arbitrary to deny the necessity for regulations giving shareholders powers to influence 
public companies. This can be explained by exploring the methods by which 
shareholders can intervene in the management of companies.  
 
Despite the fact that shareholder empowerment has been questioned in terms of 
whether it can be used to promote long-term productivity, it is accepted that 
                                              
21 Id. 
22 Leslie Hannah, The Divorce of Ownership from Control 1900: Re-calibrating Imagined Global Historical 
Trends, 49 BUS. HIST. 404, 411 (2007).  
23 Biagio Marino, Show Me the Money: The CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule and the Quest for Effective 
Executive Compensation Reform, 85 Fordham L. REV. 1355, 1362 (2016). 
24 Simon Deakin, supra note 15, at 9. 
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shareholder engagement can be helpful in preventing companies from pursuing 
short-term success. In the words of Roger Barker, Director of Corporate Governance 
of the Institute of Directors of Corporate Governance (IoD) when commenting on new 
2014 EU proposals for shareholders’ rights:25 “while we may not agree with every 
aspect of the proposal, the IoD shares the commission’s overall objective of enhancing 
long-term, constructive engagement of institutional investors with listed 
companies”26 
 
Long-term success and long-term productivity are phrases that appear in almost every 
reform document on executive compensation.27 According to the World Economic 
Forum, in a healthy market a public company’s long-term success is defined as the 
success in a company that is worth investing in, with the expectation of “holding an 
asset for an indefinite period of time by an investor with the capability to do so.”28 It 
may also be the main reason why governments choose to give shareholders the power 
of say on pay. The UK’s binding say on pay was provided because of pressure from 
institutional investors and the outrage of the public. Nevertheless, the long-term 
success of public companies and the equity market still primarily relies on all the 
factors which influence regulations, and also the same goals that governments and 
shareholders are expecting.  
 
                                              
25 European Commission, “European Commission proposes to strengthen shareholder engagement 
and introduce a “say on pay” for Europe’s largest companies”, April 2014, available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-396_en.htm?locale=en last accessed, 26 July 2018 
26 IoD, “Shareholder say on pay is vital for long-term success of companies-says IoD”, April 2014, 
available at: http://www.iod.com/influencing/press-office/press-releases/shareholder-say-on-pay-
is-vital-for-long-term-success-of-companies last accessed, 26 July 2018 
27 Such as the UK BIS’s regulation draft and revision paper, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/directors-pay-revised-remuneration-reporting-
regulations; https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/executive-pay-consultation-on-
enhanced-shareholder-voting-rights ; and the US SEC recent CEO pay ratio rule: 
http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/statement-on-open-meeting-on-pay-ratio-aguilar.html last 
accessed, 26 July 2018 
28 World Economic Forum, Global Agenda Councils, Long-term Investing, 2012, available at: 
http://reports.weforum.org/global-agenda-council-2012/councils/long-term-investing/ last 
accessed, 26 July 2018 
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The goal of long-term success is the reason why executive remuneration was defined 
as equity-based—because the equities set in executives’ pay packages may have the 
function of encouraging executives to work hard for the interest of the company and 
the shareholders, incentivizing executives to focus more on the company’s long-term 
success.29 If executives are given fixed compensation, they may be more likely to run 
the company as long as they receive compensation, or jump ship to take up executive 
positions in other companies for a higher compensation, ignoring the first company’s 
long-term success.30 However, compared with directors, shareholders are more long-
term focused. A survey by Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal suggested that 78% of 
executives would sacrifice the company’s long-term success to meet short-term 
earnings targets in order to attract more investments.31 “A chief executive may run 
the show for a few years; but a shareholder has an interest in the full lifetime of the 
company, since today’s share price is in principle determined by the discounted value 
of all future profits.”32 Even for those shareholders who are more likely to be short-
termist, such as hedge fund investors who hold shares for a period of one or two years, 
their perspective focuses on the long-term profits of the company, since they only buy 
shares when the price is relatively cheap.33  
 
Shareholders who focus on the long-term interests of the company will help to 
increase the corporate value. Edmans noted that shareholders with a considerable 
holding of shares can influence a public company’s management through market 
efficiency. Contrary to the traditional view of corporate governance, he argued that 
shareholders can improve corporate value even by using the exit channel, namely 
threatening to sell their shares.34 For shareholders, especially shareholders with a 
                                              
29 Michael Jenson & Kevin Murphy, CEO Incentives- It’s Not How Much You Pay, But How, 22 J. 
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 64, 70 (2010).  
30 Id. 
31 John Graham, Campbell Harvey & Shiva Rajgopal, The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial 
Reporting, 40 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 4 (2005).  
32 Sebastian Mallaby, Shortsighted Complaints about Short-Term Capitalism, FIN. TIMES, Opinions, 
August 6, 2015. 
33 Id.  
34 Edmans, supra note 18, at 2438.  
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relatively large holding of shares—the “blockholders” referred to by Edmans—a large 
holding of shares increases their intervention and monitoring incentives. A new way 
of thinking about shareholders was proposed by viewing them as informed traders 
instead of controlling entities.35 These shareholders would collect more information 
about the companies, not only internally but also from the markets. 36  This 
information will help them to establish more accurate and informed opinions about 
the value of the company. If their voices are ignored at meetings or their share value 
decreases, shareholders will trade in their shares. Having several blockholders trade 
in their shares at the same time may be dangerous and harmful for companies if the 
share price drops quickly and there is a significant reputation loss.37 Pressure like this 
will force the board to listen to shareholders and may help to enhance corporate value 
indirectly.  
 
Moreover, this difference in short-term and long-term focus between directors and 
shareholders leads to agency costs. 38  To stop the directors, especially executive 
directors, from using the information or power available to them due to their position 
to satisfy their own interests, companies may incentivize directors with remuneration 
packages involving equities, in order to align their interests with those of the 
shareholders. On the other hand, shareholders need to use their voting power on 
executive remuneration, which may involve out-of-pocket expenses if they have to 
obtain expertise from professional institutions to understand remuneration reports 
and make decisions.  
 
Deakin provides two reasons why current reforms are empowering shareholders in 
terms of corporate governance issues.39 First, because agency theory has been justified 
by reforms in corporate governance since the 1990s, it is now the shareholders’ right 
and their duty to ensure that executives are making the right decisions on issues in 
                                              
35 Id.  
36 Xuemin (Sterling) Yan & Zhe Zhang, Institutional Investors and Equity Returns: Are short-term 
institutions better informed?, 22 Rev. of FIN. STU. 893, 897 (2009). 
37 Alex Edmans, Blockholders and Corporate Governance, 6 ANN. REV. of FIN. ECON. 23, 30 (2014). 
38 Id. 
39 Simon Deakin, supra note 14, at 8. 
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relation to companies cash flow, while the shareholders’ standard of capital returns is 
usually stricter than the board’s when they are monitoring projects to make sure the 
firm reaps benefits and can provide stable employment. Second, shareholders may 
have a “rent-seeking” purpose, tending to use the liquidity of capital at their disposal 
to “extract” benefits from the company’s business. Similar to directors’ rent-seeking 
behaviors, shareholder rent-seeking, such as that undertaken by hedge fund managers, 
may destroy a company’s long-term success and be detrimental to other 
constituencies.  
 
Even if we disregard the first concerns around short-term shareholding influences on 
investors in corporate policymaking, the second important question is whether these 
shareholders are sincerely interested in interfering in executive remuneration. In 
addition to the shareholders’ willingness and incentives to interfere with executive 
remuneration, shareholder intervention in management policies has not been 
optimistically regarded because of information asymmetry problems. It has been 
suggested that shareholders are reluctant to intervene in management issues, and 
while voting outcomes are ignored by boards and CEOs, shareholders will put little 
effort into changing these policies.40 
 
Therefore, in relation to problems surrounding shareholder empowerment, it is 
uncertain whether the regulation is still valid in providing shareholders with the right 
to interfere in remuneration policy, and it is questionable whether the use of 
shareholder voting will be beneficial for the company’s long-term productivity. These 
questions will be analyzed next. 
 
Myners proposed in his report that although institutional shareholders had claimed 
the predominant place in the UK, these investors were still reluctant to intervene in 
                                              
40 Flip Chart Fairy Tales, Will Shareholder Empowerment Curb the Executive Pay?, (May 28, 2018, 12:33 
AM), https://flipchartfairytales.wordpress.com/2012/02/02/will-shareholder-empowerment-curb-
executive-pay/ 
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their investee companies even when the companies were underperforming. 41 
However, Myners later suggests that if shareholders were given the power to 
intervene in decisions about managers’ pay, they would be capable of making 
decisions on how to make the best of situations.42 Under Myners’ logic, shareholders 
can be active in voting and making decisions for companies if they are empowered 
with a proper design for their intervention. Sheehan mentioned that “there is an 
iterative process in the regulation of executive remuneration practice and thus the 
potential for evolution in executive remuneration practice influenced by evolutions in 
the activities of disclosure, engagement and voting”. 43  Moreover, the following 
statement in the Impact of Assessment of Improvement of Transparency of Executive 
Remuneration emphasizes the importance of providing shareholders with more 
power on remuneration:  
 
“shareholder empowerment lies at the heart of the UK’s corporate 
governance framework and the proposed reforms are consistent with that 
approach. Shareholders will be in a stronger position to promote a clearer 
link between pay and performance, ensuring that companies act in the best 
interests of their ultimate owners and contributing to a better functioning 
corporate sector more generally.”44  
 
In October 2014 the BIS published a report on the implementation of the Kay Review, 
with the purpose of building a sustainable environment for long-term equity 
investment in the UK. From the perspectives of encouraging effective engagement and 
stewardship, improving narrative reporting, forming trust-based relationships 
between investors and companies and fixing the misalignment of incentives that 
                                              
41 Paul Myners, Myners Review of Institutional Investment in the UK, The Government Response, HM 
Treasury & The Department for Work & Pension, 2001, at 11. 
42 Ib.  
43 Kym Sheehan, The Regulatory Framework for Executive Remuneration in Australia, 31 SYNDEY L. REV. 
273, 278 (2009). 
44 DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS, INNOVATION & SKILLS, Impact Assessment (IA), Improved 
Transparency of Executive Remuneration Reporting, 2012, REF 12/889, at 7. 
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would undermine this trust, this report aims at increasing shareholder involvement 
in company issues.45 In addition, the FRC offered their Stewardship Code to improve 
institutional shareholders’ stewardship responsibilities and their monitoring 
activities. 46  This is a new era for corporate governance, especially from the 
perspective of shareholder intervention. Investors, especially institutional 
shareholders, tend to focus more on the companies’ long-term business. Institutional 
shareholders are also agents for other entities.  
 
Furthermore, the remuneration principles set out by these giant investors, including 
the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF), Hermes Equity Ownership 
Services, the BT Pension Scheme, RPMI Railpen Investment, and USS Investment 
Management, suggest that management should make a material long-term 
investment in the shareholders of the businesses they manage, and the best way to 
align the interests of shareholders and executives is via the ownership of shares over 
the long term, with “ownership obligations increasing with seniority”.47 With efforts 
from both investors and government, the empowerment of shareholders in voting will 
promote the healthier development of pay practice and long-term success for 
companies in relation to executive remuneration. This is supported by the following 
reasons. 
 
The first reason why shareholders are provided with power over executive pay is that 
one important purpose of setting remuneration is to align the interests of principal 
and agent, while decreasing the risks of investors’ shareholdings. There are reasons to 
be suspicious of shareholders’ influence on long-term productivity. Institutional 
shareholdings pool money from investors and entrust this wealth to an asset company, 
                                              
45 DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS, INNOVATION & SKILLS, Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and 
Long-Term Decision Making: Implementation progress report, 2014, REF: BIS/14/1157, at 8. 
46 FRC, UK Stewardship Code, September 2012.  
47 NAPF et al, Remuneration Principles for Building and Reinforcing Long-term Business Success, 
published by Hermes, 
http://www.napf.co.uk/PolicyandResearch/DocumentLibrary/0351_remuneration_principles_for_
building_and_reinforcing%20_longterm_business_success_nov2013.aspx (last visited May 28, 2018), 
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while the investing contracts are made by investors, mutual fund managers, and the 
company. They normally have few incentives to rein in any excessive risks that 
executive managers may take (for the purpose of increasing directors’ pay); 48  in 
voting on the resolutions of the company, they are “reluctant activists”.49  These 
investors have no direct relationship with the investing company and therefore will 
not initiate proposals as regularly as other investors. On the other hand, the goal of 
fund managers is likely to be short-term, since the performance valuation of the fund 
is based on annual comparison with peer groups, and thus they seldom have 
incentives to interfere in corporate governance issues, let alone the executive 
remuneration policy, of the investing company.50 Nonetheless, this indirect relation 
does not stop investors like this having more power over voting, and intervening in 
executive pay policy and reports. Bebchuk proposes that although mutual funds are 
not a good basis for investors and fund managers to initiate management of the 
company, the other large institutional shareholders will provide a trend in favor of 
voting on resolutions for these investors to follow. 51  From another perspective, 
generally speaking, shareholders are not that dissatisfied about current executive 
remuneration designs, which contain bonuses, equity options, pensions, and other 
benefits for managers.  
 
Moreover, evidence from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), an international 
shareholders’ voting agency which provides services to nearly 1,600 institutions 
globally and is “a leading provider of proxy advisory and corporate governance 
solutions to financial market participants”,52 shows that shareholders pay attention 
to remuneration policy making and reporting, and with certain perspectives 
                                              
48 John Coffee, Liquidity Verses Control: The institutional investors as corporate monitor, 91 Columbia L. 
REV. 1277, 1334 (1991). 
49 Robert C. Pozen, Institutional Investors: The Reluctant Activists, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan-Feb, 1994, at 
148. 
50 Emilios Avgouleas, MECHANICS AND REGULATION OF MARKET ABUSE: A legal and 
economic analysis, 78 (Oxford University Press, 2005).  
51 Lucian Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REVI. 1784, at 1796 (2006) 
52 ISS, 2014-2015 Policy Survey Summary of Results, (May 30, 2018), 
http://www.issgovernance.com/iss-releases-results-annual-global-voting-policy-survey/ 
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developing from this attention, they can promote the companies’ long-term profits.  
 
In the ISS’s 2014 survey of pay for performance alignment opinions among 105 
institutional shareholders from the UK, the US, continental Europe, Canada, and the 
Asia-Pacific region, the findings revealed some of the shareholders’ opinions when 
they voted on executive pay reports.53 Their survey focused on issues of company 
performance goal setting, executive pay level, investors’ say on pay, and managers’ 
income comparison in the same industries.  
 
According to this survey, 60% of the shareholders would still be concerned about the 
company’s report on pay levels, even if the company’s performance was better than 
other peer companies in the same industry. 19% would prefer an absolute limit on the 
pay level. 14% would support proportional limits on remuneration in relation to the 
company’s absolute performance. 54  As for the say on pay issue, 63% of the 
shareholder respondents indicated that if there were positive changes in the 
implementation of pay policy in the second and third years, they would be less 
concerned and more enthusiastic about the policy they have voted for.55 With respect 
to European institution respondents, 83% of the respondents expressed their interest 
in peer group pay level comparison.56 
 
The following table represents some of the results of the survey and shows the 
attitudes of the shareholders and companies towards corporate goals and 
remuneration design. 43% of the shareholders thought that if the directors’ 
performance targets were lowered their compensation levels should change in line 
with performance targets, and only 19% of shareholders were willing to pass pay 
packages without performance linked to them in order to attract talented executives.57  
 
                                              
53 Id, at 3. 
54 Id, at 4. 
55 Id, at 5. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 9. 
 
17 
 
Source: ISS, 2014–2015 Policy Survey Summary of Results 
 
The ISS report did not give their conclusion and comments on this survey, but from 
these statistics, a large proportion of institutional shareholders from various countries 
indicated their concerns with the level of pay, the alignment between pay and 
performance, the implementation of pay policy, and also comparison in terms of pay 
levels within peer groups. Although these concerns are presented on a general scale, 
some guidelines drawn up by large institutional shareholders to promote best practice 
in terms of executive compensation will be analyzed later. With the influence from 
this large proportion of shareholders who are sympathetic to promoting pay for 
performance, Bebchuk’s previous assumption that the voting ideas of several active 
institutional shareholders can influence other shareholders and change their ideas in 
voting may be proved correct, even if other short-term shareholding investors may 
hold different voting opinions on remuneration reports before annual meetings. Thus, 
emphasizing investor power in pay policy making and reporting may be a 
trustworthy method of improving compensation governance. 
 
The second reason for empowering shareholders in terms of executive pay is that 
legislation may be an easier route to empower shareholders, since it is hard to ensure 
Q: Which of the following best reflects your institution’s idea 
of the relationship between goal setting and award values? 
Shareholder Board 
1. If performance goals are significantly reduced, target 
award levels should be commensurately modified to reflect 
the expected lower level of performance. 
43% 3% 
2. Performance goals should be set independently of target 
awards, which must be maintained at competitive levels in 
order to attract and retain top quality executives 
19% 25% 
3. The compensation committee should have broad 
discretion to set both goals and target awards at levels 
deemed to be appropriate under the circumstances 
26% 67% 
4. Other 12% 5% 
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board accountability on executive remuneration. The details of remuneration reports 
and policies which are presented for resolution must be emphasized, which reflects 
the general requirements of various regulations on compensation and transparency. 
Although there are concerns over whether shareholders will be qualified by the law 
to make decisions in relation to corporate governance, Bebchuk suggests that the 
legislative choice is always between giving shareholders powers to influence the 
running of the company, or leaving the boardroom to maintain its “indefinite” control, 
with executives having managerial influence over the board.58 We are convinced that 
the former should be considered as the preferred choice for legislation on executive 
remuneration, providing the shareholder with powers to review and supervise the 
board on executive remuneration policies. Empirical evidence to be explored in the 
following section will illustrate that allowing shareholders to review and supervise 
the board in remuneration policy making will help to reduce the undue influence of 
executives over the board. Additionally, some problems related to shareholders’ say 
on pay in practice will be summarized to allow for further discussion.  
 
1.2 Shareholders and Executive Remuneration: Experiences of the US and the UK 
in Applying Advisory Votes 
 
Investors in UK listed companies perceive the say on pay as a valuable monitoring 
mechanism, and have successfully used this power to stop executive remuneration 
levels from growing rapidly while increasing the sensitivity of pay to poor 
performance.59 With the international trend towards empowering shareholders in 
terms of managers’ remuneration issues and the globalized flow of capital, this 
shareholder voting influence on executive compensation shows general similarity 
across developed countries.60  
 
                                              
58 Lucian Bebchuk, supra note 51, at 1790. 
59 Fabrizio Ferri & David Maber, Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK, 17 
REV. of FIN. 527, 555 (2013). 
60 Nuno Fernandes, Miguel Ferreira, Pedro Matos & Kevin Murphy, Are US CEOs Paid More? New 
International Evidence, 26 REV. of FIN. STUD. 323, 325 (2013). 
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In 2009, Conyon and Sadler published a report on how shareholders reacted to the 
UK’s regulatory shareholders’ non-binding vote, investigating a large sample from 
nearly 50,000 voting resolutions of quoted companies during the period from 2002 to 
2007.61 According to their research, it is rare among shareholders to show absolute 
dissent to executive remuneration reports, with only 7% to 10% demonstrating total 
dissent across five years.62 Shareholders in the UK were satisfied with companies’ pay 
policies; over 90% of them voted in favor of the reports, and moreover this approval 
increased over the period.63 Nonetheless, in comparison with other proposals such as 
nomination and non-pay policies proposed by the board, shareholders demonstrate a 
higher level of dissent in relation to remuneration reports.64  
 
Evidence showed a negative correlation between shareholders’ positive votes and the 
level of executive remuneration, which proposed that boards reacted quickly to 
shareholders’ concerns about provisions such as rewards for failure after the 
enactment of the UK advisory shareholder say-on-pay in 2002.65 More significantly, 
poor performance by executive managers was more strongly correlated with steep 
penalties.66 Additionally, however, boards responded to shareholders’ dissatisfaction 
by adjusting the total level of executive pay, but not the structure of it,67 which still 
remains a potentially threatening issue since the level will influence one year’s pay 
but the structure, especially an equity pay design, will affect pay over the longer term. 
 
In relation to shareholder advisory votes, Ferri and Maber investigated seventy-five 
public companies that experienced a more than 20% shareholder veto on executive 
                                              
61 Martin Conyon & Graham Sadler, Shareholder Voting and Director’s Remuneration Report Legislation: 
Say On Pay in the UK, Compensation RES. INS., at 5, (2009). 
62 Id. at 23. 
63 Id, at 21. 
64 Id, at 22. 
65 Mary Carter & Valentina Zamora, Shareholder Remuneration Votes and CEO Compensation Design, 
AAA 2008 MAS Meeting Paper, at 24 (November, 2007); See also, Walid Alissa, Boards' Response to 
Shareholders' Dissatisfaction: The Case of Shareholders' Say on Pay in the UK, 24 EUR. ACCT. REV. 727, 
750 (2015). 
66 Ferri and Maber, supra note 59, at 534.  
67 Walid Alissa, supra note 65, at 728. 
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pay reports.68 The boards of these companies provided their revised pay policies with 
changes mainly introduced in two areas: existing executive contract’s notice periods, 
and executive pay’s performance-based conditions.69 After the shareholders showed 
their dissatisfaction towards the pay plan, sixteen companies reduced the executives’ 
notice period from twenty-four months to twelve months, while managers’ golden 
goodbyes were reduced to nearly half of the original amount.70 The findings of this 
research have confirmed that boards tend to reduce levels and other obvious factors 
in pay plans if there is strong dissatisfaction among shareholders.  
 
Although shareholders’ voting activities show an optimistic trajectory towards 
company pay plans since the 2002, the financial crisis 2008 definitely caused alarm for 
shareholders and governments, not only reminding them of the nonfeasance of boards, 
but also hastening legislation to provide an efficient solution. 
 
In the US, except for several provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act enforced in 2011, the 
impact of the remaining areas was uncertain. “Many companies are hedging their bets 
and will respond in more detail once the SEC confirms the rules,” said Gregg Passin, 
a partner in Mercer’s Executive Rewards team in the US.71 Meanwhile, institutional 
shareholders continue to “exert a strong influence on pay discussions but with around 
98 percent of US companies having passed their say-on-pay resolutions in 2011 and 
2012, it is fair to say that progress is being made.”72 Moreover, Mark Hoble, a partner 
in Mercer’s Executive Rewards team in the UK, commented that: 
 
“companies are considering the appropriateness of their historic pay 
decisions through the lenses of current public perception and economic 
performance. We are seeing companies undertake scenario modeling for 
                                              
68 Ferri and Maber, supra note 59, at 536. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 The HR Director, Shareholder Spring Goes Global, (May 28, 2018), 
http://www.thehrdirector.com/features/miscellaneous/shareholder-spring-goes-global/ 
72 Id. 
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their planned pay policies. This is an essential and sensible part of 
corporate risk and reputation management.”73 
 
Although the advisory say-on-pay was not implemented until 2010 in the US, 
shareholder proposals for transparency in executive pay, especially from institutional 
shareholders, had already increased significantly. Research has shown that from 2002 
to 2007, shareholders in 134 companies voted negatively on the boards’ executive pay 
proposals in their annual general meetings, which led to an overall $7.3 million 
deduction in CEOs’ pay.74 Optimistically, concerns about the structure and equity 
design component of executive pay from institutional shareholders were also revealed, 
even before the introduction of the Dodd-Frank Act.75 One goal of the US say on pay 
regulation is to promote more transparent executive compensation and better 
alignment of CEO incentives with shareholders’ interests.  
 
Studies have shown that say on pay played a positive role in achieving this goal. 
According to Kronlund and Sandy, having a say on pay vote can make companies 
change how they pay executives.76 However, despite the law’s intention to improve 
executive pay practices, the say on pay mandate has not “unambiguously” resulted in 
more reasonable CEO compensation. 77  Contrary to the goal of the say on pay 
regulation to reduce executive pay, the net result of these changes may raise, not lower, 
the total compensation. The fact that companies change pay practices between years, 
with or without shareholders voting again, is evidence that pay practices are not 
always perfectly optimal. If they were, whether a vote is held or not should be 
irrelevant for pay. 
 
                                              
73 Id. 
74 Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & Volkan Muslu, Shareholder Activism and CEO Pay, 24 REV. of FIN. 
STUD. 535, 544-45 (2009). 
75 Fabrizio Ferri & Tatina Sandino, The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Financial Reporting and 
Compensation: The case of employee options expensing, 84 The ACCT. REV. 433, 453 (2009). 
76 Mathias Kronlund & Shastri Sandy, Does Shareholder Scrutiny Affect Executive Compensation? 
Evidence from say-on-pay voting, (May 28, 2018), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2358696 
77 Id. 
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In the US, the shareholders of 2,173 public companies “overwhelmingly” approved 
their companies’ compensation reports in 2013.78 97% of the US public companies 
received shareholder votes affirming the CEOs’ pay, while only 57 companies 
experienced a shareholder advisory veto on their pay proposals.79 Evidence from the 
US advisory vote has shown that when there is increased shareholder scrutiny, the 
board does alter executive pay policies: salaries are lower while grants of restricted 
stock are higher.80 Compensation practices that are vetoed by activist investors, such 
as golden parachutes, are reduced or eliminated. These changes are consistent with 
the trajectory of improving the transparency of pay and complying with proxy 
advisory companies’ guidelines, which may help companies to ensure that the say on 
pay vote passes. However, despite these changes, the net effect is still a higher overall 
level of pay. Additionally, companies make greater use of less scrutinized forms of 
executive pay, such as pensions and golden goodbyes, if there is increased 
shareholder monitoring.81  
 
Say on pay is not a complete panacea. For instance, there is a crucial shortcoming in 
the say on pay legislation in the US. The Dodd-Frank Act requires companies to have 
a shareholder vote on pay policies in every second or third year. However, it also 
enables companies to “strategically shift pay” across years to keep compensating 
executives in the same way that they used to while also gaining shareholder support, 
thereby potentially undermining the goals of the regulation to decrease the level of 
executive pay.82  
 
Therefore, from the above it can be concluded that overall the advisory say on pay 
regulations in the US and the UK have brought several positive changes in executive 
remuneration. These changes were not only reflected in the boards’ reaction to 
shareholder dissatisfaction but also in the general level of it, although the structural 
                                              
78 John Carney, Why Say on Pay Failed and Why That’s a Good Thing, CNBC, July 3, 2013. 
79 Id. 
80 Kronlund & Sandy, supra note 76.  
81 Id., at 19. 
82 Id.  
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design of pay is still in great need of improvement and scrutiny.  
 
From the shareholder’s perspective, although regulations have given a say on pay to 
improve board accountability to shareholders, the board or the remuneration 
committee can still find opportunities to undermine shareholder engagement. 
Shareholders’ negative responses to a pay policy will be delivered before the policy is 
taken to resolution, but these negative responses may not be turned into revisions 
because of game-playing between these two parties. The concern from the US say on 
pay experience would be that more engagement and increased transparency in pay 
may not necessarily lead to board accountability and shareholder diligence to 
influence a change in the pay policy.83  
 
Providing shareholders with voting power to decide on executive pay policy has been 
accepted and implemented as a useful tool by governments as a warning and 
monitoring mechanism. Empirical evidence has also shown that this voting power has 
several effects in improving the practice of managers’ compensation plans and 
reporting. However, we think it also worth mentioning three main shortcomings, as 
follows: (1) shareholders tend to be dissatisfied when boards change the level of 
executive remuneration, but they always ignore the structure of pay plans, and 
sometimes it is difficult for shareholders to understand the pay structure; (2) 
shareholders’ voting powers have not stopped pay for failure, and golden goodbyes 
and golden hellos can be camouflaged in other ways by the board; and (3) 
governments have too often focused on the voting power of the shareholders, 
neglecting to examine how to increase the engagement of shareholders in the pay 
setting progress, and how to enhance conversations between shareholders and boards. 
The following suggestions will deal with these problems. 
 
1.3 Measures to Improve Shareholder Intervention  
 
                                              
83 Kym Sheehan, THE REGULATION OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: Greed, Accountability and 
Say on pay, 76 (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, UK Remuneration Practice, 2012). 
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It is comparatively easier to regulate listed companies by requiring their boards to act 
to serve the interests of shareholders, with few regulations requiring or encouraging 
shareholders to do anything. However, from the perspective of executive 
remuneration, shareholders may need further instructions and guidelines from 
regulation. From the discussion above, shareholders would like to have strong 
involvement in remuneration reports at AGMs, because these concern how the 
payouts of the companies are set, which or part of which could have contributed to 
shareholders’ dividends.  
 
To encourage shareholders to participate in remuneration decisions with companies 
to a greater extent, and to improve boards’ accountability, current legislation and 
corporate codes from various governments have paid significant attention to 
regulating pay transparency and the disclosure of details in pay policies. In terms of 
pay policy disclosure and shareholder understanding of problems, it may be wiser to 
prioritize the quality of pay transparency over its quantity. Shareholders will be 
responsible for understanding pay structures and single elements of each pay plan, in 
order to facilitate better communications with companies.  
 
From the discussions above, it is time for the development of stewardship codes, 
which regulate shareholders in terms of how they approach their roles in corporate 
governance. Except for some remuneration guidelines drawn up by institutional 
shareholder groups mentioned above, organizations such as the FRC in the UK and 
the ICGN (International Corporate Governance Network) based in the US have 
provided stewardship codes to give guidance to institutional shareholders so that they 
can participate more effectively in corporate issues.84 Feedback and improvement of 
these codes is ongoing, and will be discussed in the following section.  
 
                                              
84 FRC, Stewardship Code, supra note 46; see also ICGN, Global Stewardship Code, (May 28, 2018), 
http://icgn.flpbks.com/icgn-global-stewardship-principles/#p=1  
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1.3.1 Participation and Understanding 
 
It is difficult for most individual investors to understand remuneration reports. Even 
board members and other managers may find it difficult to understand their pay 
packages, which may contain equity plans, long- and short-term targets, earnings per 
share or total shareholder returns.85 Shareholders, especially small group investors, 
are encouraged to play a more active role in scrutinizing remuneration reports and 
communicating with directors. Institutional shareholders with in-house experts who 
can analyze remuneration reports and provide advice, such as the GC100 group, the 
ABI and NAPF, always renew their guidelines for executive pay reporting. These 
guidelines provide details on te formation and content of remuneration reports to 
explain every element of directors’ pay packages. Individual investors should be 
encouraged to read these guidelines if they have difficulty understanding 
remuneration reports.   
 
There are various forms and data in the remuneration reports, and shareholders 
should use their discretion and business judgment to determine whether the pay 
policy or the implementation report is fair and reasonable. With the help of the ISS 
and other consultancies, institutional shareholders can easily reach a general 
understanding of executive pay plans and reports.  
 
From the voting perspective, stewardship codes have provided a good foundation to 
encourage institutional investors to share their voting policies and results, letting the 
other shareholders have a general understanding of how better informed shareholders 
consider the pay plan and vote on it. The ICGN’s Global Stewardship Code suggests 
that institutional investors should disclose and develop their actual voting policies 
and records, seeking to explain to companies the reasons underlying why they voted 
                                              
85 Michael Skapinker, Executive Pay: The battle to align risks and rewards, FIN. TIMES, April 30, 
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against any pay policies before the shareholders’ meeting.86 The stewardship code 
contains an innovative but maybe not very practical idea, proposing that investors 
should be open to joining and collaborating with other investors from both domestic 
and overseas arenas to leverage the voice of minority shareholders and exert influence 
over corporate decisions.87 Despite its positive impact to improve relationships and 
communication among various shareholders, this idea involves a few reservations 
that need further consideration. Timing could be a thorny issue, since not all 
shareholders may be able or willing to have discussions about decisions before a 
resolution at a company’s AGM. Moreover, the cost of gathering the shareholders may 
be considerable, with agency costs increasing from a new perspective, especially in 
jurisdictions with dispersed ownership such as the US and the UK. However, time 
and costs might be undermined compared to the influence of shareholders’ 
misunderstanding of remuneration reports..  
 
Institutional shareholders, e.g. pension fund managers, banks, insurance companies 
and so on, are companies built upon the interests of their beneficiaries. The UK 
Stewardship Code suggests that institutional investors should report periodically on 
their stewardship and voting activities to their clients or beneficiaries in terms of how 
they have discharged their responsibilities.88 In a meeting held by the ICGN, Stout 
proposed that pressure from beneficiaries could make institutional investors 
concerned about their investments. Under certain circumstances, they may hold 
shares for a rather short period and sell them in a liquid market, though institutional 
shareholders are supposed to be long-term focused. 89  Although institutional 
shareholders have great influence over corporate governance public companies, 
concern about their clients’ benefits and paybacks will decrease their impact as 
valuable investors providing good guidance for small shareholders. However, rather 
than falling within the scope of the stewardship code, this question relates corporate 
                                              
86 ICGN, supra note 84, Global Stewardship Code, Principle 4, Exercising voting rights in an informed 
and responsible manner. 
87 Id., Principle 5, Engaging companies and collaborating with other investors. 
88 FRC, supra note 46, Stewardship Code, Principle 7. 
89 ICGN, Share Ownership in A Global Context-Is stewardship working?, (May 28, 2018), 
https://www.icgn.org/share-ownership-global-context-stewardship-working-0 
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governance codes and company law. It is for the boards of investee companies to 
provide methods to retain their institutional shareholders in the long term, such as 
increasing their voting power or paybacks according to their length of investment in 
the company.  
 
These methods, which are called time-weighted voting or time-weighted dividends, 
have been proved to be effective in attracting investors to keep their investment in a 
company for a long time and lead them to focus on the long-term interests of the 
company. A recent study suggests that time-weighted voting, which provides a 
shareholder with more votes per share if they invest in the firm for longer than three 
years, can empower long-term investors and may improve corporate value.90 The 
empirical evidence shows that, compared with dual-class shareholding which lets 
investors hold two different classes of shares to vote, time-weighted voting is a better 
choice for companies and shareholders to prevent “myopic” or short-term focused 
behavior among managers.91  
 
As mentioned above, if companies can provide efficient methods to retain 
shareholders’ investments or help them to focus on a long-term view, shareholders 
may be able to influence companies positively from their perspective, and use their 
two intervention channels to help companies to create remuneration policies and 
reports reflecting long-term value.  
 
1.3.2 Principles 
 
Taking the UK Stewardship Code as an example, it is not enough to require that 
institutional shareholders should disclose their voting policy and records, or be 
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willing to act collectively with other investors. 92  With the improvement of 
transparency in various reports at AGMs, especially in remuneration reports, 
shareholders need more time to analyze and understand the reports. Absorbing 
opinions from each other is important. Thus, principle 5 of this code could be revised 
to: Institutional investors should be willing to meet with other investors before 
resolution and act collectively with other investors where appropriate. 
 
In order to promote the long-term success of the company, the UK Corporate 
Governance Code provides that it is the board’s role to provide effective controls and 
methods to ensure this objective. 93  However, there is no follow-up section that 
provides detailed measures for how this should be done. In section E the Code 
requires that the board should establish a satisfactory dialogue with shareholders.94 
Perhaps in this section there should be a section E.3, proposing a new method for how 
to retain shareholders’ investment for long-term periods.  
 
Improving the shareholder monitoring function during the creation of executive 
remuneration policies and reports does not necessarily mean that shareholder value 
is the only goal that should be considered while setting managers’ pay. Boards may 
also take other issues into consideration when planning and implementing pay 
policies.  
 
2. Remuneration Practice and Board Accountability 
 
Historically, shareholders have long been seen as passive, or even irrelevant to the 
running of companies in the development of modern corporate theories. 95 
Shareholder value was even neglected during the middle decades of the twentieth 
                                              
92 FRC, supra note 46, Stewardship Code, Principles 5&6.  
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century, since what shareholders did to exercise their ownership was vote at AGMs 
which were mostly formalities, while the board had the power to delegate 
management to executives who were professionals but had no stock in the company.96 
However, other arguments around shareholder empowerment suggest that 
increasing shareholder involvement will shift the balance between the board’s 
authority and its accountability. 97  Despite the fact that it may be easier for the 
shareholders to set guidelines for an effective remuneration policy, under most 
circumstances they are not efficiently or adequately informed about what is 
happening in the boardroom. 
 
Since the proposal that executive pay should comprise more long-term incentives to 
promote the notion of “pay for performance” in the Greenbury Report 1995, the 
percentage of equity incentives in pay packages, such as restricted equity options and 
long-term incentive plans, has been increasing. The average of the FTSE 100 CEOs’ 
equity option value was 240% of their salary level in 2015, whereas this figure was 210% 
in 2014.98 However, emphasizing long-term incentives and more equity options in 
pay packages cannot effectively bring about a perfect scenario by following agency 
theory, i.e. pay for performance. Normally equity options are set to align the interests 
of shareholders and executives, and to retain and motivate directors for competitive 
performance. The reason why remuneration practice cannot achieve this alignment is 
because the board and the design of equity options in executive pay may sometimes 
be harmful to the company’s long-term success.99 Executive directors will use their 
managerial power to influence the board and its members, for example by using the 
power of promotion and awarding independent directors who are executives in 
another company with non-executive posts, and/or hiring these executives as 
members of their remuneration committee. Under this managerial influence, boards 
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and remuneration committees may show some rent-seeking behaviors in using the 
explicit influence of capital markets and products on executives’ equity holdings and 
bonuses, in order to increase the final rewards of executive directors. Mechanisms to 
stop this from happening are now considered.  
 
2.1 Director Primacy? 
 
The director primacy approach proposes that with a centralized authority and good 
use of accountability mechanisms, there should be no need for shareholders to 
approve certain detailed resolutions, since generally they are not able to make 
informed decisions. Interestingly, other arguments, either from supporters of director 
primacy who suggest that the board is reliable in making decisions, or from 
proponents of having employees on the board in order to make executive pay fairer, 
are not overly enthusiastic about the idea of using shareholder voting rights to solve 
executive remuneration problems. Early in the 1990s Villiers pointed out that because 
of information asymmetry, shareholders face various obstacles if they wish to interfere 
in corporate management,100 such as a lack of information concerning comparative 
groups’ income from remuneration consultants, or confusion about the criteria that 
remuneration committees write into pay reports relating pay to performance. There 
may be various long-term incentive plans with different conditions in a single 
executive’s pay package. Bainbridge stated that empowering shareholders in the 
corporate decision-making process might disrupt the vesting of authoritative control 
from the board in their companies.101 
 
Moreover, Sharfman argued that instead of enhancing decision making, empowering 
shareholders will increase errors and lead to “a shift of agency costs from management 
to shareholders that overcomes whatever benefit is received from a reduction in 
management agency costs”.102 Even worse, the more successful shareholder activities 
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are, the more damaging those activities are likely to be to the economy.103  
 
From the director primacy point of view, some proponents suggest that the rapidly 
growing executive remuneration is not a problem at all. According to Bainbridge’s 
understanding of the capital market, investors will not purchase stocks from 
companies which provide executives with excessive remuneration, and creditors will 
not lend money to companies which lack executive director accountability. 104 
Therefore, the cost of issuing stocks will rise for these companies while their income 
falls. As a result, these companies will become more vulnerable to hostile takeovers 
and management reconstruction, 105  which will bring more instability to both 
companies and shareholders.  
 
The problems of executive remuneration rest on the key point that effective corporate 
governance requires the decision-making authority to be vested in a small, discrete 
central agency, rather than in a large diffuse electorate.106 Bainbridge is not convinced 
that the idea of board accountability can be sustained.107 He even proposes that, if 
shareholders realize the cost of getting hold of adequate information and the 
seriousness of unreasonable interference, they will keep their distance and refrain 
from making every decision themselves, leaving most issues to the board.108 Thus, we 
are wondering to what extent we need to emphasize the notion of board accountability 
to promote the efficiency and effectiveness of executive remuneration issues.  
 
Details of the board’s function should be studied before director primacy is admitted. 
As discussed before, there are three main functions of boards. The first is a monitoring 
role, which requires them to select, compensate, and make decisions about the 
retention of chief managers while overseeing the process of accounting, financial 
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reporting and auditing, to help shareholders with these disclosures in order for them 
to make assessments of the company. 109  The second function is a 
protective/restorative role, indicating that the board should assist the company in 
claiming and protecting its resources. The third function is to formulate strategy under 
the direction of senior managers, in order to serve the shareholders in their interests 
with more information about their responsibilities while remaining accountable to 
these responsibilities.110 Executive remuneration design is within the first, monitoring 
function. Nonetheless, the third function, related to the board’s accountability to 
shareholders, should be also emphasized when considering remuneration issues.  
 
The board can develop its monitoring work in three ways: employing structure 
(different committees, such as remuneration or nomination committees, in one 
boardroom), composition (having expertise on different committees and independent 
directors to ensure unbiased decisions), and practice (concerning how to manage the 
firm to establish the board’s role). 111  Research has proven that regulation has 
relatively little to do with the evolution of the board’s structure and practice. It is the 
market and social forces that improve these elements.112 Thus, a more appropriate 
way for legislation to improve board accountability and the monitoring function of 
the board is from the composition aspect, by inviting more independent directors to 
join the functional committees. According to Langevoort’s analysis, it is the law which 
should continue to insist, or should insist more rigorously, on increasing the 
independence of boards to solve conflicts between the agent and the shareholders. 
However, Langevoort also claimed that if the law becomes too aggressive it will ruin 
the social dynamic of the board and result in a less effective working group.113 Having 
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more independent directors on executive committees will not have much influence on 
executive pay design; this is explained as follows. 
 
Delegation of various powers to the committees of boards does not function well. 
Mitchell concluded that the boards’ problems have existed from the very beginning, 
since the time boards were created to solve agency problems. 114  The board was 
designed to fulfill a monitoring function with periodic intervention by experts as a 
means of allowing outsiders, i.e. independent directors, to monitor aspects such as 
nomination, compensation, and auditing. However, the board has developed 
primarily to shield executive managers from liabilities,115 since there is only a direct 
norm from legislation to indicate what is right and what is possible in practical 
activities.116 As lawyers are usually the ones who interpret law to the companies, the 
directors’ understanding of legislative norms is second- or even third-hand,117 not to 
mention the fact that lawyers may sometimes deliver information after being 
influenced by executives. 
 
However, the companies that failed during the 2007–09 financial crisis, despite being 
criticized for having inadequate governance, did have independent boards, separate 
positions of chair and CEO, and enough defense against hostile takeovers. 118  If 
legislation is still deficient in regulating the practice of boards, shareholder 
empowerment may constitute an appropriate remedy in a corporate governance 
context. Although scholars such as Bainbridge and Sharfman are in favor of directors 
running corporations and minimizing shareholder intervention, director primacy may 
not be the most appropriate approach when dealing with executive remuneration 
issues. Bebchuk and Fried explained how executives and board members could 
benefit each other through remuneration practice. Without intervention or regulation, 
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the independence of boards and remuneration committees cannot be trusted while 
they are making remuneration policies and reports.  
 
From the arguments above, two main findings can be concluded: (1) director primacy 
is not an ideal norm to handle executive remuneration issues. Employing more 
independent directors to improve board accountability does not seem to be adequate 
to promote a more effective excursive remuneration mechanism; and (2) there should 
be other ways to improve the board accountability within its monitoring and strategic 
functions. Shareholder empowerment through the say on pay has an indirect 
influence on pay practice, but it is the remuneration committee and the board who 
have the most direct impact on pay. Hence, how should they be guided to improve 
their accountability? 
 
2.2 Practice in Order to Improve Accountability? 
 
Guidelines, principles and various codes of conduct have been created for directors 
and remuneration committees to ensure their function in remuneration design and 
implementation. However, as Cullen argued, the traditional and nondescript 
language characteristics of these codes and guidelines rely to a large extent on 
executives and other directors working towards the overarching goal of shareholder 
value by using terms such as “structure”, “performance objectives” and 
“disclosures”. 119  However, they are rather general, without providing explicit 
requirements.  
 
In fact, the GC100 and Investor Group guidance, published in 2013 and amended in 
2014,120 shows that guidelines from institutional shareholders are sometimes not as 
general as this. They are enriched by detailed requirements, regulating the aims of 
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remuneration committees in designing executive pay, the design of various financial 
incentives criteria and reporting structures, and even how the committee will 
communicate with shareholders if shareholders have concerns about the pay policy. 
Nevertheless, guidelines cannot guarantee full compliance, not to mention following 
the best practice of remuneration design. However, the GC100 principles made a good 
start in improving guidelines from shareholders and suggesting ways to promote the 
accountability of remuneration committees.  
 
Remuneration committees do not need to have expert knowledge about how to design 
pay. Instead, they need to negotiate with remuneration consultants and make 
decisions by using informed judgment. As Keay noted, with shareholders having 
more power to influence remuneration policy, the board, especially the remuneration 
committee, must increase their accountability as they are required to justify their 
decisions.121 The IoD, whose members are directors from various business sectors and 
even CEOs from large organizations, provides a detailed introduction to the regular 
work of remuneration committees in setting pay policy.122 First, good knowledge of 
running the business is critical to ensure that compensation is set at an accurate level 
in relation to basic salary in comparison with peer companies. Second, they need to 
think of financial factors and markets, which will help them with setting pay for 
performance criteria associated with shareholder returns, including annual bonuses 
and incentive plans. Third, the company’s culture must be taken into account, since 
remuneration should reflect the organization’s values and culture. The remuneration 
committee members, especially the independent directors, need to recognize the 
company’s values related to successful performance, and avoid cutting bonuses and 
risking the company’s competitiveness. At this stage, questions may logically be 
raised about how these considerations by the board and remuneration committee may 
be effectively enforced in practice. Detailed solutions to this question will be discussed 
as follows.   
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2.2.1 The Power of the Advisory Vote 
Governments tend to provide shareholders with a say on pay to intervene in 
remuneration practice by improving board and remuneration committee 
accountability. Under the principles produced by NAPF and other institutional 
investors in relation to remuneration reports, there is a full explanation of the pay plan, 
a deeper analysis of company performance and a well-debated decision based on a 
broader comparison with peer companies, which will help to build trust between 
investors and remuneration committees.123 
 
However, only in some circumstances may the remuneration committee respond to a 
negative vote result. A few cases have shown that the remuneration outcome may be 
affected by voting alone.124 Nonetheless, institutional shareholders should show and 
have already shown interest in seeing remuneration committees build their authority 
while negotiating pay, and improve their will to undertake difficult tasks to punish 
underperformance among executives.125  
 
The Burberry case in 2014 and the BG Group case in 2015 are worth analyzing to 
investigate the effectiveness of remuneration committee accountability mechanisms. 
The Burberry remuneration committee provided their CEO with £28 million for his 
first year’s compensation, which precipitated a revolt from the shareholders with 52% 
of them voting against the proposal. At the time this was the highest veto percentage 
in UK history.126 On the other hand, the board of BG Group voluntarily gave up their 
£25 million pay deal for the new CEO after shareholders showed strong disapproval 
before the resolution day. 127  The different decisions of these two boards and 
remuneration committees are worth discussing further. At Burberry the golden hello, 
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which was worth £7.5m in shares for the new CEO, had already received a veto from 
18% of their shareholders’ in 2014,128whose concerns were not unreasonable: the new 
CEO, Christopher Bailey, a designer who had previously held the position of 
Burberry’s chief creative officer, was new to the CEO post. In 2015 a big fall in retailing 
caused the company’s share price to fall by 4%, slashing the board’s pay decision and 
Mr. Bailey’s high bonus, golden hello and incentive stock pay.129   
 
Because of the high level of veto on the 2014 CEO remuneration proposal, which 
would have resulted in the highest pay among the FTSE 100 companies that year, the 
board provided a new pay policy in the following year.130 With 92.8% of shareholders 
voting yes, the revised pay policy in 2015 meant a reduction in Mr. Bailey’s income to 
£7.9m. 131  This high level of satisfaction among the shareholders was due to the 
board’s efforts in discussing executive pay plans with the majority of their fifty biggest 
investors after the previous year’s revolt.132 Though there were also other problems 
with the executive remuneration policy at Burberry, such as several inexplicable 
vested equity options in the pay structure for Christopher Bailey which were set 
before he held the chief executive position, the lesson to be learned here is that 
regulation can be used to improve the board’s accountability. Remuneration 
committees and boards should always show a willingness to facilitate and enhance 
communication with shareholders on remuneration issues.  
 
The case of the BG Group is also a good example of having a conversation with 
investors before a vote on pay policy, to avoid embarrassment. Transparency in 
executive pay is not only about putting cold statistics in front of the shareholders at 
the annual meeting, which may cause misunderstanding between the board and 
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shareholders. A process of negotiating and exchange of opinions will improve the 
board’s accountability and enable a transparent executive remuneration process. 
 
The reform of executive remuneration design carried out in the UK in 2013 separates 
companies’ pay implementation reports from their future remuneration policies. If a 
majority of the shareholders rejects the previous year’s pay implementation report, 
the board and remuneration committee should present a new pay policy in the next 
year’s annual meeting, for shareholders to vote on; this vote is binding. This regulation 
is valuable to corporate governance since it helps to increase the engagement of 
shareholders in policymaking and urges boards to enhance their communication with 
investors, especially institutional investors, thereby improving board accountability. 
The process of how a board might carry out a major review of compensation policy in 
practice may be illustrated in the following form:133 
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Source: Sheehan “The Regulation of Executive Compensation” p.91 
 
Remuneration committees should engage in a regular review of executive pay 
implementation reports, and major reviews of any new remuneration policy. As 
shown above, after a failure to pass the shareholders’ advisory vote on a remuneration 
report, the remuneration committee will examine the terms of the previous policy, 
collect data from a wider perspective and re-value the equity holdings of executives 
to provide a new calculation of the executive rewards. More importantly, they will 
increase the pre-voting negotiation opportunities with shareholders in case this policy 
also faces a revolt, because the previously rejected remuneration report may have 
made a bad impression on investors. The UK Corporate Governance Code requires 
that “the chairman of the board should ensure that the committee chairman maintains 
contact as required with its principal shareholder about remuneration”.134 The voting 
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procedure would not be the only opportunity for shareholders to express their opinion 
on executive pay policy; negotiations before or after shareholder voting on pay could 
also enhance board accountability. 
 
How to balance the needs of shareholders and executive managers is always a central 
question for the board. In the current legislation environment, the board can use 
various regulations as good opportunities to communicate with shareholders and 
managers. The importance of dialogue between the board and executive directors 
about their pay will be discussed in the following section.  
 
2.2.2. Independence and Negotiation with Executives 
Regulatory measures are unlikely to have a direct influence on board independence. 
The independence of the board is influenced by the relationship between non-
executives and executive directors. Although personal factors will have a good deal 
of impact on the remuneration committee’s judgment, independence can still be built 
upon these non-executives’ analysis of the executives’ behavior, and the non-
executives’ pursuit of decisions which may benefit both the company and the 
executives. 135  However, board accountability alone may not be sufficient for 
developing a sound executive remuneration mechanism, as “the directors on 
remuneration committees also need to be competent”.136 Under most circumstances, 
executive remuneration policy is primarily the outcome of negotiations between 
boards and their executive managers, or managers-to-be.137 Before negotiating with 
shareholders as described above, the pay policy will already have been drawn up 
under the guidance of managers. Thus, how to start and maintain the dialogue with 
managers in order to arrive at a rational pay policy is very important for boards and 
remuneration committees.  
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The Yahoo case in 2016 is helpful to explain how this negotiation can occur in practice. 
In 2012, soon after Marissa Mayer, the former vice-president of Google, was hired as 
Yahoo’s CEO, she was approached by another Google president, Henrique de 
Castro.138 Ms. Mayer told the board of Yahoo that she was negotiating with a talented 
person who would fit the position of COO (chief operating officer) perfectly, but she 
needed an attractive pay package in order to negotiate. 139  However, the board 
members of Yahoo had little knowledge of the candidate because Ms. Mayer did not 
disclose his identity.140 The new CEO provided Yahoo’s remuneration committee 
with a pay plan for the new COO herself. In a meeting lasting half an hour one day 
later the committee agreed to this pay plan, 141 but stipulated that if any material 
change was made to the plan, only the committee had the authority to approve it.142 
After this meeting, the Yahoo board suspected that Mr. de Castro was the person with 
whom their CEO was negotiating.143 One month later Mr. de Castro was hired as the 
new COO at Yahoo. Many changes had been made to his pay plan without the consent 
of the remuneration committee, but the remuneration committee did not take any 
action. 144  After the termination of Mr. de Castro’s position at Yahoo due to 
underperformance in 2014, he took his severance pay, valued at nearly $60 million, 
with $40 million of this in cash.145 Nonetheless, the equity options he chose to exercise 
before his departure were only worth $51 million at the time he left the company.146  
 
It is no longer shocking to see underperforming executives walk away with huge 
amounts of money after they have resigned or been terminated. However, it is 
shocking that the independence of boards and remuneration committees has been 
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emphasized by various legislation globally, but it remains so deficient in practice. 
Perhaps Yahoo was just an extreme case where the board ignored the negotiation 
process, but it does raise questions about why big companies like Yahoo are so eager 
to attract directors on big salaries. One of the reasons why executives may receive 
unreasonably high levels of pay is due to the labor market for senior managers. First, 
executive managers have a general idea themselves about what level of pay they can 
expect, based on comparison with their peers working in the same industry. Second, 
the pool of talented and skilled candidates from which the company could hire and 
choose within one industry is very small, particularly for senior management 
positions in public companies. Company are under huge pressure to offer attractive 
pay packages to attract new talent while retaining existing employees. Thus, another 
issue that the board and remuneration committee needs to consider is “peer group 
pay analysis” from remuneration consultants.  
 
On the subject of remuneration consultants, it is their duty to provide market data 
from peer group companies. There is no exclusive requirement for the accuracy of 
their market advice. However, these consultants should provide opinions to the 
remuneration committee fairly and responsibly in terms of their independence and 
care.147 The UK is a good example of coordinating consultants’ services, creating a 
remuneration consulting group in 2009 and producing a Code of Conduct in 2011. 
Revised in 2014, this Code of Conduct aims at clarifying the role of remuneration 
consultants in providing information, analysis, and advice on the level and structure 
of executive pay, ensuring they are making the most informed decisions according to 
an organization’s strategy, financial situation, and pay philosophy.148  
 
With general regulations in the Anglo-American system paying too much attention to 
conflicts of interest between consultants and companies,149 other practical concerns 
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should also be observed. These concerns may include setting standards for selecting 
comparative peer groups, the selection of equity incentive measures, and 
benchmarking for bonuses.  
 
Further, with current regulations and rules already defined in terms of the 
remuneration consultant’s independent role in remuneration design, 150  a future 
regulatory framework to solve the concerns above could easily be provided based on 
this independence.  
 
2.3 Suggestions 
 
From the above, there are three concerns in relation to board accountability and 
remuneration committees. First, with legislative requirements for the transparency of 
pay increasing over the years, boards and remuneration committees must ensure that 
various data are easy to understand, without the risk of leaving investors in confusion. 
Second, the shortcomings of pay policy design are still obvious. Pay for 
underperformance and even for failure still exists in various industries. Third, with 
the help of legislation, boards and remuneration committees should learn how to 
negotiate better with both shareholders and directors with regard to pay design.  
 
2.3.1 Reporting  
With the fraction of equity incentives increasing significantly in executives’ total pay 
and structure, the complexity of the pay policy always leaves shareholders confused, 
and means they have to rely heavily on advisory groups for their voting decisions. 
This phenomenon is not only inconvenient for the shareholders, but has also allowed 
directors to make the presumption that shareholders are voting irresponsibly, such as 
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in the JP Morgan case. 151  A sound pay plan or pay report should ensure that 
shareholders have sufficient information to vote upon, knowing what to expect in the 
following year and avoiding the risk of unexpected outcomes in future pay reports.152 
In the UK Corporate Governance code, it is the board’s responsibility to present “fair, 
balanced and understandable” reports to shareholders and other stakeholders.153 
However, in practice, the guidelines from NAPF et al. suggest that although many 
listed companies have long-term incentive plans and deferred bonuses designed for 
their executives, shareholders are not able to read and understand the multiple equity 
options and bonus schemes.154 There are usually several kinds of financial incentive 
appearing in the remuneration policy and report, with various different performance 
conditions set for them. 
 
For an example, Tesco’s 2015 remuneration report had several limitations. First, in its 
single total figure for each executive director’s remuneration, though it provides every 
element of pay clearly in a table, the report shows no data on how many shares each 
executive has been granted.155 Even though these long-term share options are still 
vested to be claimed after a proper period, shareholders need to have a general view 
of the quantities of shares that may be held by executives, together with their salaries, 
bonuses, and other figures. This then provides an overall picture. Second, in the “loss 
of company” section (also called the “loss of office”), there is no form to explain how 
much the company is going to pay its departing executives in total, or any explanation 
of why its former CEO would be granted various payments and benefits. 156 
Compared to the 2013–2014 remuneration report which received only a 1.38% revolt 
from its shareholders, this 2014–2015 implementation report led nearly 19% of the 
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shareholders to vote negatively.157 Besides shareholders’ dissatisfaction about Tesco’s 
share price drop during 2014 and 2015, part of the reason for this revolt was that the 
implementation report was not able to persuade the shareholders.158 Deficiencies in 
remuneration reports have not only caused confusion and dissatisfaction among 
investors, but have also led to concerns on the part of boards about future 
remuneration policy making and the reputation of the company. Apart from a 
regulatory procedure for remuneration practice, it would be better if there were some 
requirements, or at least guidelines, from the government about how to draft 
remuneration reports.  
 
Take the UK Corporate Governance Code as an example. In section D Remuneration, 
there should probably be a subsection (D.3 Conciseness) to set out how the board and 
remuneration committee should explain the pay policy and its implementation. This 
is a way to explain the policy and show how managers are paid. This would enable 
shareholders to be kept informed about their votes. Presently reports tend only to 
achieve the cold and rigid goals set by legislation.  
 
2.3.2 Flexibility 
In the cases of Morrisons and Tesco, in which departed CEOs were highly paid for 
underperformance, the remuneration committee should also have paid attention to 
the flexibility of the pay policy design. Boards need to ensure that their pay policy 
arranges various elements of remuneration, subject to appropriate adjustments at the 
discretion of the remuneration committee. 159  Although shareholders have an 
advisory vote on the compensation implementation report, this power does not enable 
them to stop pay for failure. In 2016, cases from BP, JPMorgan, Citibank and 
Volkswagen again emphasized the importance of the implementation of 
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remuneration design in practice. For example, BP’s CEO Bob Dudley had his pay 
increased by 20% in 2016 for his performance in 2015, despite the fact that BP 
experienced the worst loss in the oil industry in 2015.160 Even though BP made a loss 
of $5.2 billion in 2015, the main rise in his remuneration was from his pension savings, 
which increased due to a change in retirement benefits, as well as his annual bonus 
which increased by 40% according to the bonus target set by his remuneration 
policy.161  
 
To prevent pay for failure, shareholders should have a binding vote on pay for 
executives who leave the company in the next fiscal year after the AGM. It is creative 
and wise of the UK 2013 remuneration reform to separate the power of the shareholder 
say on pay into separate aspects of the remuneration policy and the remuneration 
implementation report. However, the implementation of the policy for executives 
departing because of poor performance and losses to the company may require 
additional attention.  
 
The French government also plans to propose a similarly flexible method of 
shareholder voting, where recent public outrage towards the motor giant Renault’s 
ignorance of their shareholders’ revolt over the compensation of the company’s CEO 
Carlos Ghosn reached the French government. On June 10th 2016, the French National 
Assembly (the lower house of parliament) passed the Minister’s measure providing a 
stricter and more binding shareholders’ say on pay for the remuneration of chief 
executives in public companies.162 The reason why the French government reacted so 
quickly and decisively to the Renault situation was partly because the French state 
owns a considerable shareholding (20%) in this company, and the state voted no to 
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the CEO’s pay.163 It may seem overly restrictive for the French government to propose 
new legislation against public companies’ ignorance of shareholder power over such 
a short term. However, this reflects a significant corporate governance issue. The 
intrinsic reason here was the lack of accountability of the board, disregarding 54% of 
the shareholders who exercised their veto over the pay deal. 164  The French 
government proposed to move further on shareholders’ say on pay than the UK 
reform, requiring that shareholders have the power to vote on remuneration 
implementation reports every year, on a binding basis.165 Surprisingly, this reform 
was supported by French institutions and proxy groups, who rejected the claim that 
the legislation provides excessive power to the shareholders.166  It seems that the 
current excessive pay for failure has caused serious concerns. 
 
The importance of a remuneration policy rests on its influence on the remuneration 
set in the future, and the issue of how to align pay with performance. On one hand, 
this is probably the reason why shareholders are given voting powers on this issue, 
giving them the feeling that they are empowered to make decisions for the company. 
On the other hand, however, implementation reports must not be underestimated. 
From a practical point of view, the implementation report decides the final scale of the 
remuneration of executives. Shareholders will not be satisfied with a merely advisory 
vote on this report, and it is crucially important from the point of view of board 
accountability that the board feels obliged to hear the shareholders’ voice in 
implementing directors’ pay, especially for departing executives who been involved 
in a loss to the company. Although it is difficult for remuneration committees and 
boards to design the variable factors in executive pay every year, this French proposal 
confirms the direction for legislation in other countries, suggesting a way to stop pay 
for underperformance.  
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The revised section 430 (2B) of the UK Companies Act 2006, introduced in the 2016 
reform, provides: 
 
“If a person ceases to be a director of a quoted company, the company must 
ensure that the following information is made available on the website on 
which its annual accounts and reports are made available – (a) the name of 
the person concerned, (b) particulars of any remuneration payment (within 
the meaning of Chapter 4A of Part 10) made or to be made to the person 
after ceasing to be a director, including its amount and how it was 
calculated, and (c) particulars of any payment for loss of office (within the 
meaning of that Chapter) made or to be made to the person, including its 
amount and how it was calculated.”  
 
According to this provision, public companies should post an online statement about 
any director leaving office, including how to calculate this director’s remuneration 
according to her pre-agreed pay policy before the loss of office. This transparency 
requirement, together with other requirements in relation to loss of office payments 
from section 226, is quite helpful for shareholders to obtain general information about 
the departing director. However, a symbolic non-binding vote does not provide 
shareholders with enough power to stop pay for failure.   
 
2.3.3 Negotiation and Responsibility 
From the shareholders’ perspective, as summarized above, the way that the UK 
reform separates the power of the shareholders’ say on pay should be noted by other 
legislative regimes and governments. The binding vote on the future remuneration 
policy did have some impact on the rapidly increasing trend of executive pay. 
However, due to different political, economic, and cultural backgrounds, a binding 
say on pay might not be suitable for every country – for example Germany, which 
already has strong trade union representation on the supervisory boards of large 
49 
 
companies to monitor directors and their pay.  
 
The design of the UK advisory vote on remuneration implementation reports escalates 
communication between shareholders, and enhances board accountability towards 
shareholders. As mentioned above, if boards and remuneration committees in the UK 
do not wish to provide another remuneration policy within a three-year period, they 
must have discussions with shareholders, especially large institutional shareholders, 
before resolution, to gain a general idea of how they will vote on the implementation 
report. This positive communication between boards and shareholders may improve 
the quality of shareholder engagement and the efficiency of remuneration reporting. 
An efficient legislative direction may be more effective than a clean-cut requirement 
in the corporate governance code that lacks enforcement measures, such as “the 
chairman of the board should ensure that the committee chairman maintains contact 
as required with its principal shareholder about remuneration.”167 The reason why 
several large UK companies upset their shareholders in relation to their 
implementation report for executive remuneration was because the directors were 
leaving their companies and their future pay policies were not due to be revised in the 
following fiscal year. This is also another reason for introducing a binding say on pay 
for departing managers as mentioned above, in order to stop pay for failure.  
 
Learning from the Yahoo case and from other empirical evidence about board 
independence from CEOs and other executive managers, improvements could be 
made to the negotiations between boards and executive directors. Negotiations 
between boards and managers may be less complicated compared with those between 
boards and shareholders. However, it is not an easy job for boards and their 
remuneration committees to maintain absolute independence during these 
negotiations. According to the managerial power approach, Bebchuk and Fried 
suggest that executive managers are able to increase their own remuneration by using 
their considerable power over boards and other independent directors on the 
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remuneration committee. Especially when companies are running smoothly, non-
executive directors usually choose to cooperate with management teams within their 
social networks.168 Even though corporate government codes in many jurisdictions 
require non-executive directors on the remuneration committee, it is almost 
impossible for remuneration committees to obtain independence from executive 
directors. Moreover, a study collecting data from FTSE 350 companies between 1996 
and 2005 has shown that the composition of remuneration committees has no 
statistical impact on the level of executive pay; the independence of the remuneration 
committee cannot guarantee that executive remuneration will remain at a reasonable 
level.169 
 
We think it is necessary and significant to emphasize the responsibility of the leaders, 
including the chairman of the board and the head of the remuneration committee. 
Legislation could provide for appraisal schemes for every director of a remuneration 
committee in order to evaluate their performance.  
 
2.3.4 Principles 
 
Suggestions for legislation regulating remuneration committees and boards may be 
summarized as follows: 
 
1. To provide guidelines for corporate governance, encouraging companies to 
provide concise remuneration reports to increase the efficiency of shareholder 
voting and the boards’ work; 
2. To make the shareholders’ vote on the remuneration report for departing 
executive managers binding, in order to prevent pay for failure; 
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3. To pursue the responsibility of the board and its remuneration committee for any 
lack of negotiation during the creation of the remuneration policy and report.  
 
3. Remuneration Design: How to improve pay for performance 
 
“A variety of legal persons are targeted by the regulation: listed companies, boards of 
directors, remuneration committees, individual executives/directors, institutional 
investors and shareholders.”170 The law only gives guidelines for progress which 
executive managers and the board can easily hide behind. Thus, we should pay special 
attention to remuneration policy design.  
 
The International Corporate Governance Network suggests that there should be three 
factors to test executive remuneration practice: transparency, accountability, and pay 
for performance. Transparency means that shareholders and the public are able to 
obtain detailed information and monitoring rights with regard to the remuneration of 
executive directors, a matter discussed in the first section in this article. The 
accountability of the board and remuneration committee to shareholders in terms of 
the practice of executive compensation, which should be improved, was analyzed in 
the second section. However, these factors are both intended to achieve the third goal, 
which is pay for performance.  
 
Pay for performance is the ultimate goal of executive remuneration practices under 
various theories that have been proposed to explain remuneration. The following 
section will present a brief analysis of how to link pay with performance in practice, 
and summarize the difficulties of regulating pay for performance from a legislative 
perspective.  
 
3.1 Pay Setting for Performance 
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Normally, most executive pay policies are set on an ex ante basis, where the level and 
structure of directors’ compensation packages are influenced by business conditions 
and the size of companies. Executive remuneration levels and company performance 
may be conditional on the companies’ investment opportunities.171 Because directors’ 
actions are seldom observable to shareholders, shareholders have to make 
investments or offer to hire executive directors based on measures they can observe, 
aligned to firm performance. Normally, because the ability to observe executives’ 
actions is decreasing, incentive compensation, which indicates market performance, 
is increasing.172 Developing from these empirical investigations, Baber et al. found 
that shareholders’ investments are associated with the company’s market-based 
performance, rather than its accounting-based performance, while the executive 
directors’ stock incentive compensation is a crucial consideration in the investors’ 
judgments.173 Because shareholders invest in the firm based on information about its 
managers’ stock income, there may be situations where executives increase their pay 
level or manipulate share prices to attract investment opportunities. Baber et al. 
inferred from their research that the influence of market-based performance factors 
on shareholders’ investment will encourage cynical executive action to attract 
shareholder interest.174 
 
Interference from legislation and government, as mentioned above, may provide 
several methods to solve or at least mitigate such situations. If there is little legislative 
intervention endowing shareholders with voting rights and regulating an 
independent remuneration committee, there may be misalignments between 
executive compensation and performance. Klapper and Love engaged in a study of 
495 public companies from various countries across twenty-five emerging markets 
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and eighteen sectors, with the purpose of investigating the relationship between 
country-level shareholder rights and national judicial efficiency. The researchers 
found that companies in countries with weak legal systems normally have lower 
governance rankings in the international data, and under those weak legislative 
situations a company’s good performance is more positively correlated with better 
market-based and accounting performance. 175  With weak regulations and poor 
governance, directors’ managerial power can easily influence pay policy, leading to a 
misalignment of pay and performance. 
 
However, there is little guidance from legislation about how to evaluate remuneration 
policy design. Regulations about managers’ compensation should also consider the 
influence of both market-based performance and accounting-based performance 
standards for executive remuneration policy. Market-based performance is measured 
against the company’s stock market return, while accounting-based performance 
concerns the accounting return on the company’s equities. Executives’ income is 
explicitly tied to stock-price performance through performance-related changes 
according to the value of their stockholdings, restricted stock options, and long-term 
stock options. Pay-performance sensitivities represent the executives’ share of the 
value that they have created. When shareholders’ wealth increases by £1, the value of 
the executives’ restricted and unrestricted stockholdings will increase in line with the 
executives’ ownership of their company’s shares. 176  Additionally, these two 
performance standards each have an impact on the other. Executive income is 
indirectly tied to stock-price performance through accounting-based bonuses, which 
reflects the correlation between accounting returns and stock-price performance, and 
also through annual adjustments of salary levels and target bonuses. 177 
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Earlier studies have confirmed theoretical assumptions that there is a linear 
relationship between executive compensation and performance from market and 
accounting perspectives. 178  In Lambert and Larcker’s comparative research, they 
propose that cash remuneration exhibits a stronger positive time-series relation with 
accounting-based performance, while market-based performance only has a modest 
time-series influence on cash pay. 179  They also suggest that companies that are 
developing quickly tend to place more emphasis on the executives’ market-based 
performance than on their accounting-based performance.180  
 
Apart from executive directors’ management behavior, other uncontrollable factors 
could also decrease the relative weight that these two performance factors have on 
executive compensation levels.181 These factors are illustrated under two perspectives: 
(1) under the force of the stock market, calculating pay-performance sensitivities from 
the executives’ option holdings aspect is more difficult than for stock holdings, since 
option values do not change dollar-for-dollar with changes in share prices;182 and (2) 
financial incentives in pay are created depending on various factors, including the 
executive’s portfolio and the company’s future risk preference. 183  Argarwal and 
Samwich suggest that the level of corporate risk, which is also known as the firm 
return variance, is an important determinant of the level of remuneration for 
executives, and it is “robust” across the other measures of firm risk.184 According to 
these financial studies, failure to allocate company risk to compensation incentives 
will underestimate the real pay for performance relation.185  
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Even with regulations providing shareholders with voting rights and requiring the 
independence of boards and remuneration committees, previous factors such as 
excessive pay for failures and wrongful incentive design to encourage executives to 
take unreasonable risks can be all explained according to these two uncontrollable 
factors, which are always ignored by regulations. Therefore, in this section these 
situations will be investigated and various methods that legislation can utilize will be 
discussed.  
 
3.2 Pay Structure 
 
3.2.1 Long-term Equity Option Vesting Period 
 
The most serious problem in relation to the realization of executive directors’ equity 
options, especially with long-term incentive plans (LTIPs), is that there are no 
requirements on the length of the post-exercise period in the current legislation.186 
Several issues in relation to long-term equity options need special attention from 
remuneration committees. These issues include a long vesting period, usually lasting 
five to ten years, an exercise point at which the executive directors can claim their 
ownership of the shares, a post-exercise period during which the director will hold 
the shares, and finally a transferability point at which they can sell the shares for cash. 
Because there currently is no limitation on the holding period, under most 
circumstances executives will use their power to push share prices to a high level and 
sell their shares immediately after the exercise point. This type of managerial behavior, 
focusing on short-term profits, will certainly jeopardize companies’ long-term success 
and shareholders’ long-term interests.  
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Equity markets and product markets may sometimes help with pay for 
underperformance. Under good industrial performance or if the company has 
performed badly on previous occasions, the equity options of executive managers will 
increase dramatically without any effort on their part due to long-term incentives, 
such as improvements in the company’s share prices. 187  Peer group review is a 
method that remuneration committee can use to avoid paying executives for under-
performance. This type of review includes an evaluation of the level and structure of 
executive pay given by comparative companies in the same industry. This analysis 
may be carried out by the remuneration committee, by remuneration consultants, and 
sometimes even by the managers. 188  The reason why the companies and 
remuneration consultants should pay attention to this comparison is that shareholders, 
especially institutional shareholders, already recognize peer group reviews as a 
general performance measure for long-term incentive plans.189  
 
Perhaps long-term incentive plans may work better if corporate governance codes, or 
even legislation such as the Companies Act, were to require that these equity options 
would be exercisable at least three to five years after the vesting period. This will be 
particularly relevant for executives who have left companies with their work 
accomplished. These long-term vested equities prove that they have contributed to 
the companies’ long-term productivity. Even though they are not able to claim their 
money, the companies would normally reward and compensate them with other 
bonuses, short-term incentives, and benefits. If executives are dismissed or resign 
because of underperformance, companies will probably cancel their long-term 
incentive plans.  
 
For example, the UK Corporate Governance Code states that: 
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“for share-based remuneration the remuneration committee should 
consider requiring directors to hold a minimum number of shares and to 
hold shares for a further period after vesting or exercise, including for a 
period after leaving the company, subject to the need to finance any costs 
of acquisition and associated tax liabilities. In normal circumstances, shares 
granted or other forms of deferred remuneration should not vest or be paid, 
and options should not be exercisable, in less than three years. Longer 
periods may be appropriate. Grants under executive share options and 
other long-term incentive schemes should normally be phased in rather 
than awarded in one large block.”190  
 
According to Deloitte’s study on the executive remuneration reports of FTSE 350 
companies, 51% of the FTSE 100 companies and 32% of the FTSE 350 companies now 
include in their long-term incentive equity plans a further holding period after 
exercise of the options.191 It may be observed that Schedule A has provided a good 
example in encouraging public companies to adopt a longer holding period in long-
term incentive plans. This improvement has also shown that under good direction 
from regulation, it is possible to develop and adjust the structure of executive 
remuneration policy and regulate it through soft law.  
 
Also, if governments feel that this legislation has intervened too heavily in the 
governance issues of public companies, institutional shareholders can strongly 
recommend in their remuneration guidelines that their investee companies should 
provide longer vesting periods in their equity incentives.  
 
As the next step to promote a longer holding period for exercisable shares, this paper 
proposes regulations to push remuneration committees to provide reasons in 
remuneration policies, together with using the expertise of consultants from peer 
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group analysis, but allowing that the holding period should be shorter than three 
years under special circumstances.  
 
3.2.2 Short-term incentive options 
 
The HSBC case is worth discussing as it raises several interesting points concerning 
pay policy design. The HSBC remuneration committee proposed a policy to benefit 
the long-term profits of the company in 2011. Top executives would only be able to 
sell their equity options after their retirement.192 From the remuneration structure 
discussion above, it is positive that these top executives in the banking sectors must 
maintain their equity holdings for a longer time. The HSBC remuneration committee 
designed their long-term incentive plan with five years as a vesting period, in order 
to promote the company’s future success. 
 
This policy has influenced the level of pay of HSBC’s CEO, Stuart Gulliver; his pay 
was £12.5 million in 2011, but his remuneration was £7.5 million, £7.4 million, £8 
million and £7.6 million from 2012 to 2015 respectively.193 However, shareholders 
were confused by the criteria suggested by John Thornton, the chairman of the 
remuneration committee at that time, which suggested measuring the share awards 
in a way that was not based on the company’s share returns.194 Also, in 2015 nearly 
30% of the HSBC shareholders voted against the CEO’s pay report, compared with 16% 
in 2014 and 11% in 2013, because of some misconduct in investing and a sudden 
increase in Gulliver’s basic salary.195 The increase in the shareholder veto in 2014 was 
due to the newly introduced EU executive bonus cap rule, whereby executive bonuses 
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and other financial incentives cannot be more than 100% of their salary, or 200% with 
the shareholders’ approval. Gulliver’s salary increased by 70%, from £2.5m to £4.2m, 
and he complained that “we had a compensation plan here that the shareholders liked 
but sadly because of the EU directive we’ve had to change it. This isn’t something we 
would have wanted to do. … It’s much more complicated.”196 
 
Thus, although long-term incentives are now the most contentious issue in executive 
pay packages, other elements such as bonus plans and other short-term incentives also 
have an impact on total pay levels and shareholders’ attitudes towards pay reports.  
 
With the use of restricted share options and long-term equity plans increasing rapidly 
since the late 1990s and during the 2000s, managers took “unnecessary and excessive” 
risks to enhance share prices up to 2008, which brought the attention of the public and 
governments to focus on managers’ compensation.197  In 2010 long-term incentive 
options made up 47.8% of the total pay of the US Fortune 500 companies, compared 
with 44.7% in 2006; in the UK, FTSE 350 executives received their remuneration with 
long-term incentives comprising 49.6% in 2010 and 39.7% in 2006.198 As discussed 
above, measures such as increasing the vesting periods for long-term equity plans, 
recovering deferred bonuses, and reducing golden parachutes were already 
implemented before the financial crisis.199 Their role in linking performance and pay, 
and how to regulate them in law, will be analyzed next. 
 
Short-term incentives, normally annual bonuses and restricted equity options, may 
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be granted to executive managers after a conditional period, which is shorter 
compared to long-term incentive options. These short-term incentive plans are more 
heavily influenced by the company’s business strategy and financial status compared 
with long-term incentive plans, which are mainly designed to promote long-term 
relationships with executives. Executives tend to sell all of their shares after the 
vesting period, so it is in their own personal interest to boost the share prices before 
selling, or to focus excessively on short-term prices for those options while neglecting 
the long-term performance of the firm.200  
 
In our opinion, the rules for reporting short-term incentive pay should be embedded 
in the corporate governance code, under the “comply or explain” principle. Under 
Murphy’s theory, the economic cost of companies granting equity options should be 
emphasized and calculated as if the companies did not grant those shares to its 
managers. Murphy suggests that, first, remuneration committees and boards should 
calculate their company’s income as if its executive managers were not granted short-
term share plan.201 After this calculation, remuneration committees and boards can 
include these figures in the company’s remuneration report, or even show what the 
company has spent on granting shares to managers instead of selling them to outside 
investors. This requirement will improve the transparency of pay reporting, and 
promote the long-term success of the company through shareholder engagement and 
monitoring.  
 
NAPF’s institutional shareholders alliance principle on executive remuneration 
suggests that there has been too much debate between companies and investors 
around short-term or medium-term compensation designs.202 They suggest that the 
current average three-year period of equity vesting in executive pay may not be the 
best way to promote long-term success, particularly for the largest and most complex 
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companies such as those listed in the FTSE 100.203 Studies of executive compensation 
from the financial industry suggest that to stop executive managers focusing on short-
term profits and gaining excessive pay by using strategies such as inflated asset prices, 
incentive plans should be extended to five to ten years, not only for long-term equity 
plans but also for restricted share options.204  
 
To promote the companies’ long-term success, Bhagat and Romano even propose that 
financial incentives in executive pay should all be changed into restricted stock or 
long-term stock options.205 The condition they suggest for financial incentives is that 
after the vesting period executive directors should wait for two to four years after their 
resignation or their last day in office to sell the shares they already owned at the time 
of their departure.206  
 
In terms of financial incentive development, short-term incentives may be merged 
gradually with long-term incentive plans, because shareholders prefer to invest in 
companies where executive remuneration is based more on long-term share plans.207 
However, due to the advantages of short-term options over long-term incentives, such 
as attracting new executive managers to join the business and paying managers for 
short-term performance by encouraging long-term commitment, investors seem to be 
more inclined to approve short-term plans.208 Thus, removing the pay element from 
the executive remuneration structure may not be the best proposal. 
 
3.3 Fair Pay? 
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3.3.1 Fairness in Regulation 
A central question in whether governments should regulate pay gaps is how far the 
government can intervene in fairness issues.  
 
Fair pay issues from company law and corporate governance perspectives can be 
categorized according to two factors. First, how do pay gaps and inequality between 
executive directors and employees in a company influence the lower-level employees’ 
performance and the company’s long-term productivity? Second, is inequality 
considered by directors when they are making pay decisions? If so, under what 
circumstances should regulation towards fairness occur?  
 
There have been several studies showing that increasing dispersion in pay in a 
company leads to lower productivity, less cooperation, and larger threats to 
turnover.209 Hicks discussed the importance of the psychology of workers in 1963, 
noting that “it is also necessary that there should not be strong feelings of injustice 
about the relative treatment of employees since these would diminish the efficiency of 
the team”.210 Additionally, research has indicated that companies will perform better 
with less dispersion in pay because the employees are less resentful towards the 
executives and more willing to contribute to the company.211 
 
Therefore, a negative correlation can be postulated between high levels of 
compensation of executives and employees, and the performance of employees and 
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even the whole company. Then, the next essential question to arise will be how to 
address the problem of pay inequality. 
 
Wade, O’Reilly, and Pollock studied 122 public companies over a five-year period and 
proposed that, first, CEO compensation is correlated positively with the lower-.level 
employees’ pay, and second, CEOs are concerned with fairness as well as their own 
self-interest, and while they are negotiating to increase their own payment they will 
also think about their subordinates and, if possible, the employees.212  
 
In August 2015 the US government provided a disclosure requirement on the ratio 
between the pay of regular employees and that of top executives. A new section 953(b) 
of the Dodd-Frank Act clarified that a public company’s pay policy needs to give a 
record of the ratio of the total remuneration of its CEO to the median total 
compensation received by the rest of its employees, which will promote board 
accountability to shareholders in relation to executive compensation practices.213 As 
noted by the SEC Chair Mary Jo White, this rule “provides companies with substantial 
flexibility in determining the pay ratio, while remaining true to the statutory 
requirements”.214 
  
From the SEC’s statements, this new provision aims to promote board accountability 
for executive remuneration and flexibility in pay policy design by providing 
shareholders with clear pay ratio information in annual reports, proxy statements, and 
even registration statements. Though it touches on the topic of reporting pay ratios in 
the pay report, this new rule says nearly nothing about fairness in pay, or about 
narrowing the pay gap between CEOs and employees. Although “think tanks” in the 
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US and the UK have both suggested that pay ratios should be used to decrease pay 
gaps and inequality in the work place,215 the new section in the Dodd-Frank Act does 
not seem to draw attention to these issues. 
 
The rationale behind this disclosure requirement for pay ratios may be found in the 
SEC’s proposal for amendments to section 953(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act, which 
requires listed companies to provide a clearer description of the relationship between 
the executive compensation paid to the managers and the shareholders’ total share 
return. It also requires a description of the relationship between the company’s total 
share return and the share return of comparative peer group companies over the 
preceding five years, chosen by the compensation committee. 216  This proposed 
amendment will help shareholders by providing detailed remuneration reports with 
additional information to enable them to vote on remuneration issues. 
 
The US shareholder say on pay stays at the advisory level. Requiring a pay ratio to be 
reported in the pay statement may provide shareholders with a more general view of 
CEO pay levels. However, it rarely provides ways to decrease pay gaps. Governments 
in the UK and the US are still focused on attracting investment for their public 
companies by providing shareholders with more detailed information and the power 
to decide on pay policies and reports. A possible solution may relate to redistribution, 
tax regulation, or else it may draw from another corporate governance model, for 
example the German model. Providing shareholders with power to veto proposals 
may not be the best way to stop inequities in pay.  
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August 27, 2016, https://inequality.org/research/2014-executive-pay-reform-scorecard/ (last visited 
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3.3.2 Having Employees on the Board? 
The German corporate governance model certainly does not suit every jurisdiction. 
Nonetheless, it does provide some useful lessons. The Volkswagen case shows that to 
stop pay for underperformance, it is not enough to have employees on the board. After 
the German auto giant’s emissions scandal in 2016, the management board members’ 
bonuses were cut by 30%.217 However, this reduction in executive pay did not assuage 
the dissatisfaction of its shareholders.218 TCI, an aggressive UK-based activist investor 
with £993 million invested in Volkswagen, published a letter to the company’s 
management and supervisory boards about the shareholders’ requirements for 
executive remuneration reform.219 In the letter, this hedge fund investor suggested 
that the reason why managers in Volkswagen could be paid for underperformance 
was due to their efforts to save unnecessary job losses and increase employees’ 
wages.220 Because the company has employees representing the German Labor Union 
on its supervisory board, and because these employee representatives have the power 
to decide how to pay management teams, it becomes crucial and logical for executives 
to pay extra attention to employees’ interests to maintain their compensation level. 
After an evaluation of Volkswagen’s recent cash-flow and payouts, TCI also pointed 
out that shareholders should have the power to monitor executive pay practice by 
annual voting on the remuneration report and via intervention from investors, which 
could be an effective way for more effective executive pay practice.221  
 
Besides this letter, governance experts have also expressed concerns about having 
employees on the board. Their first concern is the accountability of the board. Under 
                                              
217 Reuter’s, VW Management Accepts Bonus Cuts of at least 30 percent: source, April 13, 2016, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-volkswagen-uaw-idUSKCN0XA1WU, (last visited May 28, 
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shareholder-revolt.aspx (last visited May 28, 2018). 
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221 Id. 
 
66 
 
German law, half of the supervisory board seats are reserved for employees, who are 
likely to lack professional management knowledge. This lack of expertise may 
undermine board accountability to shareholders. Since 2002 the chairman of 
Volkswagen has first discussed business issues with the workers’ council and agreed 
a position, and then brought it to the shareholders—unlike the situation in the UK, 
where the chairman arrives at a common position with the shareholders first and then 
talks with the board.222 A former Volkswagen executive once said that “the board was 
really a show”.223 Although there are employee representatives on the board, these 
representatives do not seem to be active in performing their monitoring and 
supervising job as expected. Current and former employee representatives of 
Volkswagen supervisory board have stated that they knew nothing of the company’s 
emissions cheating and had never discussed engine issues with any other director.224  
 
The second concern comes from the board’s interaction. To ensure that employee 
representatives are willing to allow a generous pay package, executives may place too 
much emphasis on gaining employees’ favour and support, neglecting payback for 
shareholders and the whole company’s interests. Tilley noted that to regain the 
public’s trust on executive remuneration, it is necessary to ensure that a pay policy is 
“embedded with a strategy for delivering long-term sustainable corporate growth”.225 
Companies’ long-term interests should be set as the main goal of remuneration design 
and practice, rather than the balance among the interests of shareholders, managers 
and employees. The employee monitoring function aims to improve the independence 
of the board and the remuneration committee. However, if employee representatives 
start leaning towards increasing managers’ pay for underperformance, the problem 
will be the same with non-executive independent directors; in fact, it may be even 
worse, since independent directors may not have a strong relationship with the 
company. One lesson to be learnt from Volkswagen is that governments should 
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consider carefully before introducing legislation that accommodates employee 
representatives on the board.  
 
There have been several other suggestions, such as having more employees holding 
the equity of the company; “broader capital ownership would curb income and wealth 
inequality, expand investment and employment, and reduce the demand for 
redistribution through the state.”226 This may be a wise option to enable a company 
to benefit and retain valued employees. However, from the legislation perspective, it 
is not the duty of either the Companies Act or a corporate governance code to 
intervene that much. On the other hand, if benefitting and retaining employees is to 
draw the attention of regulation, as in German companies, perhaps regulations like 
this may not bring improvement for executive remuneration.  
 
Reports of an increase in general income and the recovery of pay in the public sector 
may indicate that the UK government should refrain from introducing additional 
regulation to promote fairness at the moment. Perhaps this overall increase was one 
reason why the UK parliament turned down a law on reporting pay ratios and placing 
employee representatives on boards to negotiate payment issues.227 The UK is still a 
country with the default shareholder primacy norm embedded in company law and 
corporate culture.228 Additionally, while workers’ wages are increasing at their fastest 
rate for six years229 and in the context of the UK’s smooth economic recovery, which 
has shown decreased unemployment and inflation since 2011,230 there will be fewer 
opportunities to regulate for a pay cap in this country. Pay inequality can be controlled 
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by corporate governance, but if long-term firm productivity is not affected by the pay 
gap, then inequity problems may not addressed by law.  
Conclusion 
 
Mooney suggested that executive remuneration should be simplified in structure, and 
reforms should push companies to reduce the complexity of their reports.231 However, 
this suggestion for simplifying pay structures probably stems from only a partial 
understanding of pay structures and practice. It is difficult to avoid complexity in 
executive pay since it derives from variation in the incentives set for managers, 
although the aims of those incentives can be stated simply and clearly in pay reports 
and policies. It is the job of remuneration committees and boards to make those aims 
accountable to shareholders for resolution. Since the movement in favor of the 
shareholder say on pay has become a popular legislative approach but also has proved 
to have difficulties in implementation, current regulations should be developed upon 
the present foundations to improve the quality of shareholder monitoring.  
 
Due to variation in cultures and industries, each government has a unique method of 
regulating remuneration practice. This article only provides suggestions for 
legislations that are useful under general regulatory conditions. In relation to 
shareholders’ voting power, this article proposes to improve understanding of the 
complexity of remuneration reports. Shareholders should have a meeting before they 
vote on executive remuneration issues, to improve their understanding of the 
complexity of the remuneration report. In order to prevent pay for underperformance 
among executive directors, shareholders should have a binding vote on the 
implementation pay reports of executives who are going to leave the company. In 
relation to board accountability, suggestions have been made that facilitate better 
communication with shareholders. A concision requirement should be imposed on 
remuneration reporting content and structure, perhaps via the corporate governance 
code. In order to promote the independence of board members and their negotiation 
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with executive directors on executive remuneration, legislation should be introduced 
to impose liabilities upon members who do not fulfil their duty of care. From the 
perspective of pay for performance, companies’ long-term interests may be promoted 
through executive remuneration structure adjustment. Regulations should encourage 
companies to increase the executives’ shareholding period after these shares have 
been exercised, and companies should disclose the economic cost of issuing restricted 
share options to executive directors.These proposals cannot guarantee that executive 
compensation levels will be reduced, but they may make remuneration practice, such 
as shareholder engagement in reports and remuneration committee accountability, 
more efficient.  
 
Shareholder engagement in shareholding meetings and their passivity in relation to 
corporate governance are still huge concerns. However, with the globalization of the 
shareholder say on pay as a corporate governance measure to align pay with 
performance, evidence has shown that there is a trend towards participating in pay 
resolutions among international mutual funds, pension funds, hedge funds, and 
individual investors.232 Although providing shareholders with a say on pay does not 
necessarily lead to pay for performance and promote the company’s long-term success, 
with more investors who are knowledgeable about and willing to engage in 
remuneration practice, shareholder intervention may develop in a positive direction.  
 
Additionally, from the point of view of executive directors’ incentives, several metrics 
have been designed to award managers for their leadership, community skills, and 
teamwork, as long as this performance results in effective management. Financial 
performance measures are usually calculated on a quantitative basis, but these non-
financial performance criteria are qualitative.233 The standards for paying managers 
for their non-financial performance may be quite subjective compared to financial 
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incentive schemes. Current concerns about the relationship between remuneration 
committees and executive managers will make it even harder for legislation to provide 
appropriate methods to pay directors for their efforts, ethics, and reputations. 
 
